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NOTES 
Cults, Deprogrammers, and the Necessity Defense 
As membership in religious "cults"1 has increased dramatically 
during the last decade,2 public concern for the welfare of cult mem-
bers, who are largely young adults,3 has also risen apace.4 As a re-
sult, many parents have taken drastic action to protect their children 
from these groups. Some parents have gained temporary legal con-
trol over their children, 5 but attempts to work within the legal system 
I. In Peterson v. Sorlien, 299 N.W.2d 123, 126 (Minn. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1031 
(1981), the Minnesota Supreme Court stated: "The word 'cult' is not used pejoratively but in 
its dictionary sense to describe an unorthodox system of belief characterized by '[g]reat or 
excessive devotion to some person, idea, or thing.'" (citing WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL 
DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE UNABRIDGED 552 (1976)). 
2. Some authorities suggest that over 3000 cults operate in the United States, see, e.g., 
Clark, Cults, 242 J. A.M.A. 279 (1979); Levine, The Case for .Deprogramming Religious Cult 
Members, SOCIETY, Mar.-Apr. 1980, at 34, 38, with membership estimates ranging from sev-
eral hundred thousand to several million. Rudin, The Cult Phenomenon: Fad or Fact? 9 
N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 17, 18-19 (1980). See generally J. MAcCoLLAM, CARNIVAL 
OF SOULS 174-75 (1979). ' 
3. The great majority of cult members are between 18 and 25 years old. J. MAcCoLLAM, 
supra note 2, at 52. 
4. Critics charge that many cults recruit members deceptively, and then employ various 
techniques to ensure the members' complete obedience to the leaders' will. Once this loyalty is 
obtained, members adopt a rigidly proscribed lifestyle, which includes long hours devoted to 
fundraising and recruiting. See Galanter, Rabkin, Rabkin & Deutsch, The "Moonies'~· A Psy-
chological Study of Conversion and Membership in a Contemporary Religious Sect, 136 AM. J. 
PSYCH. 165, 167 (1979) (members worked an average of 67 hours per week, compared to 41 
hours before joining); Rudin, supra note 2, at 27 (cult followers sometimes work eighteen to 
twenty hours a day, seven days a week). 
For critical analyses of cults, see Delgado, Religious Tota/ism: Gentle and Ungentle Persua-
sion Under the First Amendment, 51 S. CAL. L. REv. I (1977); LeMoult, .Deprogramming Mem-
bers of Religious Sects, 46 FORDHAM L. REv. 599 (1978); Note, High .Demand Sects: .Disclosure 
Legislation and the Free Exercise Clause, 15 NEW ENG. L. REv. 128 (1979); Comment, Piercing 
the Religious Veil of the So-Called Cults, 1 PEPP. L. REV. 655 (1980). Cults have been more 
favorably assessed in DeSocio, Protecting the Rights of Religious Cults, 8 HUMAN RIGHTS 38 
(1979); Note, Legal Issues in the Use of Guardianship Procedures lo Remove Members of Cults, 
18 ARiz. L. REV. 1095 (1976); Comment, "Mind Control" or Intensity of Faith: The Constitu-
tional Protection of Religious Beliefs, 13 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 751 (1978); Note, 
.Deprogramming Religious Cultists, 11 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 807 (1978); Note, Conservatorships 
and Religious Cults, .Divining a Theory of Free Exercise, 53 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1247 (1978); Com-
ment, The .Deprogramming of Religious Sect Members: A Private Right of Action Under Section 
1985(3), 74 Nw. U. L. REv. 229 (1979); Note, People v. Religious Cults: Legal Guidelines far 
Criminal Activities, Tort Liability and Parental Remedies, 11 SUFFOLK L. REv. 1025, 1048 
(1977); Note, Abduction, Religious Sects and the Free Exercise Guarantee, 25 SYRACUSE L. 
REv. 623 (1974). Both sides of the debate are thoroughly discussed in the articles in Colloquium 
-Alternative Religions: Government Control and the First Amendment, 9 N.Y.U. REV. L. & 
Soc. CHANGE I (1980). . 
For a thorough annotated bibliography of published and unpublished literature relating to 
cults, see T. ROBBINS, CML LIBERTIES, "BRAINWASHING" AND "CULTS" (1979). 
5. See text at notes 197-98 infra. 
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have frequently failed.6 Frustrated by the perceived inadequacy of 
legal alternatives, other parents have hired "deprogrammers,"7 who 
abduct children from cults and confine them for several days of 
treatment.8 Although precise figures are unavailable, some evidence 
suggests that the number of deprogrammings runs into the 
thousands.9 
Efforts by cult members to obtain legal protection against 
deprogramming have yielded mixed results. 10 Deprogrammers pros-
ecuted for kidnapping or false imprisonment have relied on the ne-
6. Criminal actions brought against cult leaders have beeq. unsuccessful. See People v. 
Murphy, 98 Misc. 2d 235,413 N.Y.S.2d 540 (Sup. Ct. 1977). After hearing testimony by a cult 
member's mother explaining her reason for deprogramming her daughter, a grand jury voted 
not to indict the participants in the deprogramming. The grand jury instructed the district 
attorney's office to continue its investigation into the activities of the cult (the Hare Krishna), 
which eventually led to this criminal case. The defendants, leaders of the cult, were acquitted, 
Civil actions against cult leaders have also failed. See, e.g., Turner v. Unification Church, 
473 F. Supp. 367 (D.R.I. 1978), qffd, 602 F.2d 458 (1st Cir. 1979) (suit alleging that cult had, 
among other things, conspired to hold plaintiff in peonage and involuntary servitude was dis-
missed for failure to state a claim). Courts have rebuffed attempts to "free" children with 
habeas corpus petitions. See Helander v. Unification Church, I Fam. L. Rep. 2797 (D.C. 
Super. Ct. 1975). 
7. For a description of deprogramming from the point of view of the most active and 
controversial deprogrammer in the United States, see T. PATRICK & T. DULACK, LET OUR 
CHILDREN Go! (1976). 
8. Ted Patrick claims, "All deprogramming is is talk - a lot of talk. It only lasts two or 
three days." Id at 77. Others have suggested that the techniques used by deprogrammers are 
"'like the Gestapo.'" Abducted woman tells of horror of brainwashing, Cath. Reg. (Toronto), 
Mar. 22, 1975, at I, col. 2, 3, reprinted in Deprogramming: Documenting the Issue 72 (1977) 
[hereinafter cited as Deprogramming: Documenting the Issue] (a collection of documents pre-
pared by Herbert Richardson for the American Civil Liberties Union and the Toronto School 
of Theology Conferences on Religious Deprogramming) (copy on file with the Michigan Law 
Review). In some cases, after spending several days in "intensive deprogramming sessions in a 
physically confined setting," the deprogrammed youth may be sent to a rehabilitation center 
for several weeks. Kim, Religious .Deprogramming and Subjective Reality, 40 Soc. ANALYSIS 
197, 204 (1979). 
9. See Delgado, supra note 4, at 80 ("approximately 1,000 deprogrammings have been 
attempted in the last few years"); Panel .Discussion: Regulation of Alternative Religions by Law 
or Private Actions: Can and Should we Regulate?, 9 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 109, 117 
, (1980) [hereinafter cited as Panel .Discussion] (statement of Jeremiah Gutman) (estimating that 
thousands of people have been deprogrammed, and pointing out that Ted Patrick claims to 
have participated in approximately 1600 deprogrammings). 
10. Tort actions were unsuccessful in Weiss v. Patrick, 453 F. Supp. 717 (D.R.I.), qffd, 588 
F.2d 818 (1st Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 929 (1980) (cult members claim that deprogram-
mers had conspired to deprive her of civil rights and actions based on assault and battery and 
false imprisonment dismissed because of absence of evidence of compulsion); Baer v. Baer, 450 
F. Supp. 481 (N.D. Cal. 1978) (motion for partial summary judgment granted against cult 
member claiming deprivation of civil rights because of absence of evidence of state involve-
ment); Peterson v. Sorlien, 299 N.W.2d 123, 128 (Minn. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1031 
(1981) (false imprisonment action against parent dismissed because the child's conduct, after 
several days of deprogramming, demonstrated consent to the restraint, and this consent "re-
lates back" to her initial confinement). However, in Rankin v. Howard, 457 F. Supp. 70 (D. 
Ariz. 1978), revd, 633 F.2d 844 (9th Cir. 1980), the court denied in part the defendants' motion 
for summary judgment in an action by a cult member alleging interference with his civil rights. 
Motions to dismiss were denied in similar actions. See Ward v. Connor, 657 F.2d 45 (4th Cir. 
1981); Cooper v. Molko, 512 F. Supp. 563 (N.D. Cal. 1981); Augenti v. Cappellini, 84 F.R.D. 
73 (M.D. Pa. 1979); Mandelkorn v. Patrick, 359 F. Supp. 692 (D.D.C. 1973). 
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cessity defense, 11 which has traditionally exculpated defendants who 
violated a law to avoid a greater evil than the law was designed to 
prevent.12 In deprogrammine cases, the defense has proceeded in 
two stages. Defendants argue first that the parents reasonably be-
lieved deprogramming necessary to protect their child from physical 
and psychological harm.13 Deprogrammers then claim that they, as 
the parents' agents, should also benefit from the parents' defense be-
cause few parents could protect their children without assistance. 14 
The courts have split on the legitimacy of this defense. 15 
11. See generally Arnolds & Garland, The JJefense of Necessity in Criminal Law: The Right 
to Choose the Lesser Evil, 65 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 289 (1974); Glazebrook, The Neces-
sity Plea in English Criminal Law, 30 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 87 (1972); Hawkins, Necessity as a Stat-
utory JJefense in Texas: A Comparison with Other States, 3 AM. J. CRIM. L. 233 (1975); Huxley, 
Proposals and Counter Proposals on the JJefence of Necessity, 1978 CRIM. L. REV. 141; Sulli-
van, The Defense of Necessity in Texas: Legislative Invention Comes of Age, 16 Hous. L. REV. 
333 (1979); Tiffany & Anderson, Legislating the Necessity Defense in Criminal Law, 52 DEN. 
LJ. 839 (1975); Williams, Necessity, 1978 CRIM. L. REV. 128; Note, Necessity as a JJefense, 21 
COLUM. L. REV. 71 (1921); Case Note, 13 Sw. L.J. 265 (1959). 
12. See, e.g., w. LAFAVE & A. Scorr, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW 382 (1972). The 
Model Penal Code's necessity defense provides: 
Section 3.02. Justification Generally: Choice of Evils. 
(I) Conduct which the actor believes to be necessary to avoid a harm or evil to himself 
or another is justifiable, provided that: 
(a) the harm or evil sought to be avoided by such conduct is greater than that 
sought to be prevented by the law defining the offense charged; and 
(b) neither the Code nor other law defining the offense provides exceptions or de-
fenses dealing with the specific situations involved; and 
( c) a legislative purpose to exclude the justification does not otherwise plainly 
appear. 
(2) when the actor was reckless or negligent in bringing about the situation requiring a 
choice of harms or evils or in appraising the necessity for his conduct, the justification 
afforded by this section is unavailable in a prosecution for any offense for which reckless-
ness or negligence, as the case may be, suffices to establish culpability. 
MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.02 (Proposed Official Draft 1962). 
13. See T. PATRICK & T. DULACK, supra note 7, at 270. 
14. Ted Patrick, for example, relies on both official reluctance to prosecute parents for 
abduction and false imprisonment and his belief that deprogr<lID.Illers may assist parents in 
such activities: 
From my research into the subject I was reasonably well assured that a parent would not 
be prosecuted for kidnapping his own child, especially if the child was a minor. With that 
in mind, I began to formulate the basis of my approach to seizing the children and 
deprogramming them. The first rule was always to have at least one of the parents present 
when we went to snatch somebody. The parents would have to make the first physical 
contact; then, no matter who assisted them afterwards, it would be the parents who were 
responsible. And !fa parent was not committing a crime by seizing his or her child, no one 
else could be considered an accessory to a crime. 
T. PATRICK & T. DULACK, supra note 7, at 65 (emphasis added). 
15. Patrick has been acquitted twice in New York. Brown, Memorandum on Ted Patrick 
and Religious Cults, in Deprogramming: Documenting the Issue, supra note 8, at 138. Patrick 
was also acquitted in Washington. United States v. Patrick, 532 F.2d 142 (9th Cir. 1976). Pat-
rick was convicted of false imprisonment in Colorado, in Peop~e v. Patrick, 541 P.2d 320 (Colo. 
App. 1975), and was convicted along with the cult member's parents, of misdemeanor kidnap-
ping, in Orange County, California. See Individual Freedom Foundation Newsletter, reprinted 
in Deprogramming: Documenting the Issue, supra note 8, at 134. Most recently, Patrick was 
convicted in San Diego, California, of conspiracy, false imprisonment, and kidnapping. This 
was the first time that Patrick was convicted of a felony. See People v. Patrick, N.Y. Times, 
Aug. 30, 1980, at 7, col I (San Diego Super. Ct. Aug. 29, 1980). 
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This Note considers the applicability of the necessity defense in 
criminal prosecutions of parents and deprogrammers. Part I ex-
plores the conflicting policies that underlie the traditional necessity 
defense, and suggests that courts replace their unitary approach to 
necessity with a "choice of evils" defense - for actors reasonably 
attempting to avoid a greater evil - and a "compulsion" defense -
for actors reacting understandably to the pressure of circumstances. 
Part II applies these defenses to deprogramming cases, and con-
cludes that rarely may they be advanced successfully. 
I. A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK FOR JUDGING NECESSITY CASES 
A. The Inadequacy of a Unitary Approach to Necessity 
The necessity defense, like any other doctrine of excuse or justifi-
cation, 16 should be sustained whenever its underlying policies are 
furthered. 17 Identification of those policies is, therefore, a prerequi-
16. A defense can either justify or excuse behavior that would otherwise be criminal. 
Broadly speaking, a defense justifies behavior when it recognizes "an exception to a general 
rule making [certain behavior punishable] ..• because the policy or aims which in general 
justify the punishment" do not apply in a specific case. . . . [W]hat is done is regarded as 
something which the law does not condemn, or even welcomes." A defense excuses behavior 
when "(w]hat has been done is something which is deplored, but the psychological state of the 
agent when he did it exemplified one or more of a variety of conditions which are held to rule 
out the public condemnation and punishment of individuals." H. HART, Prolegomenon to the 
Principles of Punishment, in PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 1, 13-14 (1968). The distinc-
tion has been explained as "the same as that between being forgivably wrong and being right, 
or between being pardoned and being praised." Arnolds & Garland, supra note 11, at 290. 
On the nature of excuse and justification generally, see H. HART, Legal Responsibility and 
Excuses, in THE CONCEPT OF LAW 174-75 (1961); Eser, Just!ftcation and Excuse, 24 AM. J. 
COMP. L. 621 (1976); Fletcher, The Individualization of Excusing Conditions, 41 S. CAL, L. REV, 
1269 (1974); Hall, Comment on Just!ftcation and Excuse, 24 AM. J. COMP. L. 638 (1976); Robin-
son, A Theory of Just!ftcation: Societal Harm as a Prerequisite for Criminal Liability, 23 UCLA 
L. REV. 266. The confusion regarding the nature of the necessity defense (and perhaps confu-
sion regarding the difference between excuse and justification) is evident in the split among 
courts and co=entators on whether the necessity defense functions as an excuse or a justifica-
tion. Most courts, however, view the defense as a justification. See, e.g., United States v. 
Bailey, 585 F.2d 1087, 1098 (D.C. Cir. 1978), revd., 444 U.S. 394 (1980); United States v. 
Micklus, 581 F.2d 612, 615 (7th Cir. 1978); State v. Marley, 54 Hawaii 450, 471, 509 P.2d 1095, 
1109 (1973). A minority of courts have viewed the defense as an excuse, which mitigates rather 
than eliminates criminal responsibility. See, e.g., Frasher v. State, 8 Md. App. 439, 448, 260 
A.2d 656, 662, cert. denied, 400 U.S. 959 (1970), See also R. PERKINS, PERKINS ON CRIMINAL 
LA w 956 (2d ed. 1969). The better view is probably one which acknowledges that necessity 
can function as either a justification or an excuse, depending on the nature of the case. See 
Fletcher, supra, at 1274-77. C.f. United States v. Randall, 104 Daily Wash. L. Rep. 2249, 2251 
(D.C. Super. Ct. 1976) ("Traditionally, the defense of necessity has been characterized as being 
either a justification of or an excuse for criminal activity."). 
17. For a thorough survey of the various theories behind the recognition of "excusing con-
ditions" in the criminal law, see H. HART, supra note 16, at 28-53. Hart argues: 
[E]xcusing conditions are accepted as something that may conflict with the social utility of 
the law's threats • . . . Recognition of excusing conditions is seen as a matter of protec-
tion of the individual against the claims of society for the highest measure of protection 
that can be obtained from a system of threats. In this way the criminal law respects the 
claims of the individual as such, or at least as a choosing being, and distributes its coercive 
sanctions in a way that reflects this respect for the individual. 
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site to analysis of the traditional approach to the defense. Although 
defendants plead necessity infrequently, 18 they have sought to apply 
the defense to remarkably diverse types of conduct. 19 The varie-
gated necessity cases, however, divide readily into three distinct fact 
Id at 49 (emphasis in original). See also Fletcher, supra note 16, at 1299-309 (arguing that 
American law, unlike German law, resists recognition of excuses or defenses that would re-
quire inquiry whether specific defendants in particular cases deserve punishment). 
18. See J. HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 416 (2d ed. 1960) ("The expli-
cation of [the necessity doctrine] in English and American law, which has perforce dealt only 
piecemeal with peripheral aspects of the general problem, is disappointing."); W. LAFAVE & 
A. ScoIT, supra note 12, at 383 ("[T]he cases are not numerous .... "); G. WILLIAMS, CRIMI-
NAL LAW 731 (2d ed. 1961) ("There are few American authorities."). It has been suggested 
that the paucity of cases involving the defense can be attributed to the unwillingness of law 
enforcement officials to prosecute in cases involving a clear, compelling claim of necessity. See 
Arnolds & Garland, supra note 11, at 291. 
19. The necessity defense has been raised in cases involving cannibalism, see Regina v. 
Dudley & Stevens, 14 Q.B.D. 273 (1884) (defendants were sentenced to death, but sentence 
was later co=uted to six months imprisonment), and human.jettison, see United States v. 
Holmes, 26 Cas. 360 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1842) (No. 15,383) (defendant convicted of manslaughter, 
but his six month sentence was later remitted). It has also justified mutinies, see, e.g., United 
States v. Borden, 24 F. Cas. 1202 (D.C. Mass. 1857) (No. 14,625) (revolt was justified if the 
crew had good reason to believe, and did believe, that they would be subjected to unlawful and 
cruel or oppressive treatment); United States v. Nye, 27 F. Cas. 210 (C.C. Mass. 1855) (No. 
15,906) (jury instructed that revolt was justified if there were reasonable grounds to believe the 
ship unseaworthy), entries to embargoed ports, see, e.g., The Diana, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 354 
(1868) (necessity defense rejected absent demonstration of actual necessity); Brig Struggle v. 
United States, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 71 (1815) (necessity defense rejected absent evidence of 
actual necessity); The William Gray, 29 F. Cas. 1300 (C.C.D.N.Y. 1810) (No. 17,694) (defend-
ants acquitted based on necessity defense), and killing animals to protect property, see, e.g., 
Aldrich v. Wright, 53 N.H. 398, 16 Am. Rep. 339 (1873); Cross v. State, 370 P.2d 371 (Wyo. 
1962). 
More recently, the defense has frequently been used in cases involving prison escapes. See, 
e.g., United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394 (1980) (rejecting necessity and duress defenses); 
Dempsey v. United States, 283 F.2d 934 (5th Cir. 1960) (court rejected prisoner's '1ustifica-
tion" defense because he had not requested aid from prison authorities); State v. Hom, 58 
Hawaii 252, 566 P.2d 1378 (1978) (necessity defense was available if certain conditions existed, 
and the defense should have been submitted to the jury); People v. Unger, 66 Ill. 2d 333, 362 
N.E.2d 319 (1977) (reversed conviction because defense of necessity should have been submit-
ted to jury); Iowa v. Reese, 272 N.W.2d 863 (Iowa 1978) (rejected necessity defense because 
prisoner failed to return after escape); People v. Brown, 68 A.D.2d 503, 417 N.Y.S.2d 966 
(1979) (justification defense rejected because prisoner did not return after escaping); State v. 
Whisman, 33 Or. App. 147, 575 P.2d 1005 (1978) (choice of evils defense rejected because there 
was no showing that the harm avoided was present, imminent, and impending). The appropri-
ate method for analyzing escape cases has also received extensive discussion in law reviews. 
See, e.g., Fletcher, Commentary, Should Intolerable Prison Conditions Generate a Justffecation 
or an Excuse For Escape, 26 UCLA L. REv. 1355 (1979); Gardner, The .Defense of Necessity 
and the Righi to Escape from Prison, 49 S. CAL. L. REv. 110 (1975); Note, .Duress - .Defense to 
Escape- Substantial threats of homosexual attack may support the defense of duress in a prose-
cution far prison escape, People v. Harmon, 53 Mich. App. 482, 220 N. W.2d 212 (1974), 3 AM. J. 
CRIM. L. 331 (1975). 
Social protesters have also made frequent use of the necessity defense. See, e.g., Note, 
Necessity as a .Defense to a Charge of Criminal Trespass in an Abortion Clinic, 48 U. CIN. L. 
REv. 501 (1979). Persons claiming medical necessity have advanced the defense as well. See 
United States v. Randall, 104 Daily Wash. L. Rep. 2249 (D.C. Super. Ct. 1976) (necessity 
defense successfully asserted by defendant who claimed marijuana was necessary to treat his 
glaucoma); United States v. Richardson, 588 F.2d 1235, 1239 (9th Cir. 1978) (defense of neces-
sity was unavailable to persons caught smuggling laetrile into the country because "there were 
alternative means of obtaining the drug). 
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situations, which reveal that the defense may serve several indepen-
dent and potentially conflicting policies. 
Each of the paradigmatic fact situations requires that an actor 
choose between obeying or breaking a law under circumstances 
where some harm is inevitable regardless of the actor's decision.20 In 
the first situation, an actor violates a law to avoid a greater harm 
than that caused by the violation. For example, the theft of a car to 
rush a dying relative to the hospital might be excusable because the 
legislature would condone conduct that burdens or destroys property 
to save life.21 In the second situation, an actor violates a law in a 
good faith, but ultimately unsuccessful, attempt to avert a greater 
harm. He might, for example, steal a car to rush a dying pet to a 
veterinarian - a normative mistake if the legislature would let the 
pet die22 - or misjudge the magnitude of the harm caused or 
avoided, and destroy $3000 worth of property to save $1000 worth-
a factual mistake.23 In the third situation, an actor violates a law to 
avoid a harm that he knows society considers less grave than the 
harm caused. A husband who sacrifices two strangers to save his 
wife typifies this category of actor. 
In each of these situations, society may find compelling reasons 
for choosing not to punish the actor. Most commonly, the necessity 
defense is grounded in the utilitarian notion that society benefits if 
an actor, by violating a law, avoids a greater harm.24 Punishment in 
20. The harm is inevitable in the sense that some harm will ensue regardless of the actor's 
choice. In this Note, "harm avoided" refers to the harm that can be avoided or the interest 
that can be protected by breaking the law; "harm caused" denotes the harm that must be 
endured or the interest that must be jeopardized should the actor elect to disobey the law. 
21. It is fairly well accepted that property may be appropriated or even destroyed in order 
to save life or prevent injury. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.02, Comment (Tent. Draft No. 8, 
1958) (mountain climber may enter dwelling during storm and appropriate provisions therein; 
ship captain may jettison cargo to preserve ship and passengers). 
The validity of the actor's value choice, and therefore the applicability of the defense, is 
always measured with reference to what the legislature would have done if faced with a similar 
situation. See G. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 790 (1978). This is recognized in 
the Model Penal Code. See MODEL PENAL CODE, supra, at§ 3.02(l)(c). 
22. A "normative mistake" is made when the actor believes that the type of harm avoided 
by breaking the law is more severe than the type of harm caused. In some cases, the proper 
choice is clear; for example, it is generally conceded that property may be appropriated or 
destroyed in order to preserve life or avert injury. See note 21 supra. In other cases, however, 
the proper choice is not as clear. To the extent that the necessity defense is premised on a 
utilitarian rationale, see text at notes 24-26 infra, the actor's choice will be subject to a post-hoc 
scrutiny that inquires whether the legislature would have made the same choice. In fact in 
such situations the necessity defense "makes the judge (an} ad-hoc ... legislature." See M. 
KADISH & S. KADISH, DISCRETION TO OBEY 124 (1973). 
23. The mistake is factual in the sense that the actor has misestimated the degree of harm 
either caused or avoided by breaking the law. This type of mistake differs from the normative 
mistake in that here the actor is correct in his evaluation of the normative ''weight" to be 
assigned the two harms. The actor's mistake and his failure to secure the greater good result 
from the fact that his decision to break the law causes more harm or avoids less harm than the 
actor had anticipated. 
24. See, e.g., W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTI, supra note 12, § 50, at 382 ("The rationale of the 
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the first situation, for example, may discourage socially desirable 
conduct. Although a violation by an actor in the second category 
may make society worse off, society also has a utilitarian interest in 
encouraging action when it reasonably appears that intervention will 
prevent a greater evil.25 Even if the actor's belief that society would 
favor intervention was unreasonable, it is unclear whether punish-
ment will in fact result in fewer normative and factual errors.26 Util-
itarian principles, however, cannot affirmatively justify exculpating 
the third type of actor. 
An actor's lack of criminal intent may also underlie acceptance 
of the necessity defense in certain circumstances. 27 Where an actor 
violates a law in a successful attempt to avert what the legislature 
would consider a greater harm, he is not culpable in any meaningful 
sense of the word. 28 Because a number of factors - including supe-
necessity defense is not that a person, when faced with the pressure of circumstances of nature, 
lacks the mental element which the crime in question requires. Rather, it is this reason of 
public policy: the law ought to promote the achievement of higher values at the expense of 
lesser values, and sometimes the greater good for society will be accomplished by violating the 
literal language of the criminal law."); Fletcher, supra note 16, at 1274 ("The rightness of the 
act typically turns on a comparison of the utility of acting (the value of the interest saved) with 
the disutility of acting (the value of the interest sacrificed). Rightness is thus a matter of maxi-
mizing utility, or furthering the greater good."). 
25. There is no reason to suspect a priori that actors will more often than not make the 
wrong decision when confronting inevitable choices. At the same time, it has long been con-
ceded that there are "such rare occurrences that it may be thought pedantic to legislate for 
them expressly beforehand, and rash to do so without materials which the course of events has 
not provided. Such cases are the case of necessity (two shipwrecked men on one plank) (and] 
the case of a choice of evils . . . . Fiction apart, there is at present no law at all upon the 
subject, but the judges will make one under the fiction of declaring it, if the occasion for doing 
so should ever arise." Stephen, The Criminal Code, (1879), 7 THE NINETEENTH CENTURY, 
136, 156 (1880) (footnote omitted). 
A more comprehensive accounting of the cost involved in exculpating actors for their un-
successful attempts to avoid the greater harm by breaking the law would probably take ac-
count of the possible decrease in respect for law and reduced certainty of the applicability in 
-~P-ecific situations. See Powers, Structural Aspects of the Impact of Law on Moral .Duty Within 
Utilitarianism and Social Contract Theo,Ji;-26-UCL-A-L-:-REV. 1263-(1979). 
26. Because choice of evils situations arise infrequently, most individuals will not ponder 
the penalties of an incorrect choice in advance. And those individuals who do face these situa-
tions are likely to experience pressures that make consideration of punishment highly unlikely. 
See Greenawalt, Co,!fllcts of Law and Morality- Institutions of Amelioration, 61 VA. L. REV. 
177, 195 (1981): 
It would certainly be a drawback if the existence of the defense encouraged actors to 
violate the law without sufficient assessment of whether their actions really were necessary 
to avoid greater evils. As far as private actors and ordinary circumstances are concerned, 
this possibility is implausible in the extreme, because such a rarely used defense is un-
likely to have a sigruficant effect on how private persons react to emergency situations. 
27. See Hawkins, supra note 11, at 236, where it is suggested that in addition to its utilita-
rian purpose, necessity has been based on "the belief that he who acts to avoid an imminent 
harm has acted commendably (with good intentions). To punish him, therefore, would bring 
the law in general into disrepute." (footnote omitted). 
28. The actor is not culpable because by breaking the law the greater good has been se-
cured. See, W. LAFAVE & A. Scorr, supra note 12, § 50, at 382; G. WILLIAMS, supra note 18, 
§ 229, at 723 ("[W]hen a man has acted meritoriously, even a technical conviction is out of 
place. . • . Needless convictions are an abuse of the machinery of the criminal law and tend 
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rior information, greater intelligence, or mere luck - may determine 
whether an actor does or does not avoid the greater harm, the second 
type of actor is no more culpable than the first.29 In the third situa-
tion, however, the actor cannot claim that he failed in an honest at-
tempt to avoid what society would consider the greater harm. If 
good intentions are the sole determinant of culpability, actors in the 
third category are more culpable than those in the first two. 
Yet the third type of actor's behavior may be "understandable''. 
even though he did not intend to avoid what society considers the 
greater evil. As used here, "understandable" means that the behav-
ior is to be expected - other individuals would make the same deci-
sion under similar circumstances. 30 Some courts have suggested that 
punishment is inappropriate in these situations because individuals 
to adulterate its effect.") The actor should not be subject to penalty because "All laws admit 
certain cases of just excuse, when they are offended in letter, and where the offender is under 
necessity, either of compulsion or inconvenience." More v. Hussey, 80 Eng. Rep. 243, 246 
(1609). 
The question, of course, is under what circumstances are acts that would otherwise be 
criminal justified because they tend to secure the "greater good." But if it can be demonstrated 
that a particular act does further some higher value, it follows that punishment is inappropri-
ate under any theory of punishment that focuses solely on the propriety of punishing the 
individual: 
Many of the ordinary reasons for punishment simply do not apply when actors are mor-
ally justified in engagmg in behavior that ordinarily is illegal. . . . [M]orally justified acts 
are not, on balance, harmful to the legitimate interests of the members of society, and 
society would not want to discourage those acts. Society has no reason to prevent such 
acts by means of incapacitation, general and individual deterrence, and norm reinforce-
ment. If the act has been performed for morally justifiable reasons, moral delinquency 
could not be a basis for punishment, and commission of the act would not provide a 
ground for reform of character. Nor could the majority of society desire vengeance if it 
recognizes the appropriateness of the act. 
Greenawalt, supra note 26, at 182. 
29. In both situations the actor intends to violate the law and therefore "intends" to bring 
about some harm. But in both situations the actor intends to avoid the greater harm, and 
thereby secure the greater good, by violating the law. The difference, therefore, is in the out-
come, and not in the actor's intent. If both actors intend to secure the greater good (or intend to 
avoid the greater harm), the actor in the second situation is no more culpable than the actor in 
the first. In this sense the actor in the second situation does not intend that his violation bring 
about the balance of harm (harm caused exceeding harm avoided) that results from either a 
normative or a factual mistake. Punishment therefore runs contrary to the notion that "our 
substantive criminal law is based upon a theory of punishing the vicious will. It postulates a 
free agent confronted with a choice between doing right and doing wrong and choosing freely 
to do wrong." F. SAYRE, CASES ON CRIMINAL LAW xxxvi-xxxvii (1927) (Introduction, Roscoe 
Pound). See also H. HART, supra note 16, at 114 ("All civilized penal systems make liability to 
punishment for at any rate serious crime dependent not merely on the fact that the person to 
be punished has done the outward act of a crime, but on his having done it in a certain state or 
frame of mind or will."). 
30. One commentator, addressing this issue in the context of the duress defense, has per-
ceptively noted that the question is not whether an actor could make the "correct" choice, but 
rather whether it is fair to expect that choice of the actor given the extreme pressure acting 
upon the actor owing to the nature of the interests at stake: "I am extremely reluctant to 
regard all or even most cases involving duress or coercion as cases where, given psychological 
pressures, the individual could not have acted otherwise. . • • Rather we do not even expect 
him lo try. We rely instead on the belief that the choice is unfairly posed." Murphy, Consent, 
Coercion, and Hard Choices, 61 VA. L. REV. 79, 85-86 (1981) (emphasis added), 
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are "compelled by circumstances"31 and do not act with legal free 
will. 32 This analysis is incorrect: The legal elements of a volitional 
act are present in these cases.33 It is more accurate simply to concede 
the actor's error and ask whether society should punish the behavior. 
The notion that society may wish to exculpate actors rather than 
hold them to standards that average individuals could not meet, 
while not affirmatively supported by utilitarian principles,34 may not 
contravene those principles. Punishing actors in the third category 
may serve ·no practical purpose. Even the prospect of the death pen-
alty will not necessarily deter an actor who seeks to avert death or 
serious injury to himself or someone close to him in an emergency 
situation. 35 
Although courts cognizant of each of the policies underlying the 
31. Cf. United States v. Mowat, 582 F.2d 1194, 1208 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 967 
{1978) (in discussing necessity, the court suggested that the test was whether there was "suffi-
cient compulsion"); The William Gray, 29 F. Cas. 1300, 1302 (C.C.D.N.Y. 1810) (No. 17,694) 
("The variety of cases in which the absence of will excuses those who would otherwise be 
offenders, have been mentioned in the course of the argument, and among them we find that 
on which this defense proceeds, namely, an act which proceeds from compulsion and inevita-
ble necessity."). 
32. See, e.g., People v. Keating, 118 Cal. App. 3d 172, 173 Cal. Rep. 286, 289 n.l (1981); 
State v. Green, 470 S.W.2d 565, 570 (Mo. 1971) (en bane) (Seiler, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 
405 U.S. 1073 (1972) (''The affirmative defense of coercion and necessity are based upon the 
same principle. 'If a person commits an act under compulsion, responsibility for the act cannot 
be ascribed to him since in effect, it was not his own desire, or motivation, or will, which led to 
the act.'" (footnote omitted) (citing Newman & Weitzer, .Duress, Free Will and the Criminal 
Law, 30 S. CAL. L. REV. 313, 313 (1957))). 
33. A criminal walking to execution is under compulsion if any man can be said to be so, 
but his motions are just as much voluntary actions as ifhe was going to leave his place of 
confinement and regain his liberty. He walks to his death because he prefers it to being 
carried. This is choice, though it is a choice between extreme evils. 
J. STEPHEN, A. HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 102 (Burt Franklin: Research 
and Resource Series No. 71, 1964). See, e.g., State v. Michne, -Me.-, 427 A.2d 455 (1981). 
34. Utilitarian principles do not justify exculpating such actors because t4e individual 
knows that society considers the harm avoided less grave than the harm caused. Society is 
worse off because the law is broken. ' 
35. Hobbes recognized that even the most severe penalties would not serve to deter actors 
in such situations: 
(N]o law can oblige a man to abandon his own preservation. And supposing such a law 
were obligatory; yet a man would reason thus, .(/ I do it not, I die presently; !f I do it, I die 
afterwards; therefore by doing it, there is time of l!fe gained; nature therefore compels him 
to the fact. 
T. HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 197 (New York 1947) (1st ed. London 1651) (emphasis added). Wil-
liams takes the same position: 
Observe that the reason for withholding punishment is not that the threat of punishment 
has failed to operate in this particulan:ase, for that is true of every crime . . . . (W)e 
generally cannot tell until after the event whether a threat of punishment will deter a 
particular person. . . . It is only in certain classes of cases that we can say with reaonable 
probability that the threat of punishment will not deter. When we can say tliis, utilitarian 
theory demands that the threat of punishment be not employed, for it can result only in 
useless suffering. 
G. WILLIAMS, supra note 18, at 738. See also Wechsler & Michael, A Rationale of the Law of 
Homicide (pt. 1), 37 CoLUM. L. REV. 701, 738-39 (1937). 
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necessity defense would justify or excuse36 actors in all three situa-
tions, courts accept the defense in practice in only a narrow range of 
cases. Most courts rely on a single formulation of the necessity de-
fense regardless of the facts of particular cases and the policies that 
are implicated.37 To advance the defense successfully, a defendant 
must establish that (1) he perceived38 the action necessary to prevent 
an im.minent39 harm;40 (2) the harm avoided outweighed the harm 
that the law was designed to prevent;41 and (3) there existed no rea-
36. This distinction has one important effect. When conduct is justified, it establishes a 
new rule of law to govern the value conflict faced by the actor: The court has decided that in 
choosing between two possible courses of action, the actor has chosen the correct one. Conse-
quently, any actor in similar circumstances in the future should make the same choice. Fletch-
er, supra note 16, at 1275-76. Consider, for example, a court that holds that parents are 
justified in having their child deprogrammed. The court is saying that society has benefitted 
and hence the conduct is justified, when the choice of evils is resolved in favor of deprogram-
ming. This rule will govern such choices in the future. In contrast, because excuses focus on 
the particular actor's mental state, they do not establish a rule of law binding future actors. 
Eser, supra note 16, at 635. The fact that one actor was not blameworthy because his mental 
state was such that his conduct is excused, does not mean that a later actor, in the same circum-
stances, will be excused if he makes the same choice. Whether the actor is excused will be 
determined by focusing on his particular mental state. 
It should be noted, however, that these differences are moderated to some extent by the fact 
that justifications and excuses are rarely used in their "pure" form. For example, with any 
justification there is going to be some consideration of the actor's mental state. If the actor 
intended to co=it a harmful act, but the act turned out to be beneficial because of circum-
stances of which he was unaware, courts do not hold that the act is justified. See Bavero v. 
State, 347 So.2d 781, 784 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977) (prisoner escaping must prove that he did 
so to avoid imminent danger, rather than with intent to elude lawful authority); MODEL PENAL 
CODE§ 3.02, Co=ent 5 (rent. Draft No. 8, 1958); Gardner, The Defense of Necessity and the 
Right to Escape From Prison -A Step Towards Incarceration Free from Sexual Assault, 49 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 110, 119-20 (1975). The same rule has also developed in self-defense cases. See, 
e.g., Josey v. United States, 135 F.2d 809 (D.C. Cir. 1943). Moreover, in considering excuses, 
courts do not focus exclusively on the mental state of the actor. Decisions are in part based on 
certain assumptions about the way society can expect the actor to behave (this is most evident 
in the use of the reasonable man standard). Courts may focus more on circumstances, and 
assumed mental states, than on an individual actor's mental state. 
37. q: United States v. Bailey, 585 F.2d 1087, 1098 (D.C. Cir. 1978), revd., 444 U.S. 394 
(1980) (noting the "tendency of courts to structure duress/necessity defenses in terms of ••. 
fixed rules"). 
38. The rule has been stated by Lafave and Scott as follows: 
An honest (and, doubtless, reasonable) belief in the necessity of his action is all that is 
required, however, so that he has the defense even if, unknown to him, the situation did 
not in fact call for the drastic action taken. Thus if A kills B reasonably believing it to be 
necessary to save C and D, he is not guilty of murder even though, unknown to A, C and 
D could have been rescued without the necessity of killing B. 
W. LAFAVE & A. Scorr, supra note 12, § 50, at 386. See Arnolds & Garland, supra note 11, at 
294; Tiffany & Anderson, supra note 11, at 868. 
39. See, e.g., United States v. Ashton, 24 Cas. 873, 874 (No. 14,470) (C.C.D. Mass. 1834); 
State v. Johnson, 289 Minn. 196, 201, 183 N.W.2d 541, 544 (1971); State v. Graham, 201 Neb. 
659, 662, 271 N.W.2d 456, 458 (1978); State v. Burney, 49 Or. App. 529, 619 P.2d 1336, 1339 
(1980); W. LAFAVE & A. Scorr, supra note 12, § 50, at 388. 
40. W. LAFAVE & A. Scorr, supra note 12, § 50, at 386; Arnolds & Garland, supra note 
II, at 294. 
41. This balancing is done objectively by the court, and not by the actor himself. See W. 
LAFAVE & A. Scorr, supra note 12, § 50, at 259. 
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sonable alternatives to violating the law.42 Because courts have tra-
ditionally been wary of the defense,43 many limit it in other ways as 
well.44 Under this formulation, courts accept the defense in many 
cases where the defendant successfully averted a greater harm and in 
some cases where the defendant attempted to prevent a greater harm 
but failed. However, most courts, over occasional dissents and de-
spite scholarly criticism,45 reject the defense in the third fact 
situation. 
The rationale for this unitary approach to the necessity defense is 
rarely expressed,46 but it appears to be based on a compromise be-
tween notions of utilitarianism and nonculpability that is not wholly 
consistent with any of the policies underlying the defense. The com-
42. See, e.g., United States v. Mowat, 582 F.2d I 194, 1208 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 
967 (1978); State v. Marley, 54 Hawaii 450, 472, 509 P.2d 1095, 1109 (1973); People v. Dalton, 
7 Ill. App. 3d 442, 287 N.E.2d 548, 550-51 (1972). 
43. The reluctance to recognize the defense probably stems from a fear that the "principle 
once admitted might be made the legal cloak for unbridled passion and atrocious crime." 
Regina v. Dudley & Stephens, 14 Q.B.D. 273,288 (1884). The premise of the defense arguably 
runs counter to "the proposition that, however it may be that . . . persons come by their 
thoughts and motives, it is possible for them to control their conduct - at least as regards the 
infliction of serious harms." J. HALL, supra note 18, at 415. 
44. For example, necessity is not a defense to killing an innocent person. See, e.g., Regina 
v. Dudley & Stevens, 14 Q.B.D. 273 (1884); R. PERKINS, supra note 16, at 957. There are no 
cases in this country in which necessity has been accepted as a defense to the killing of another 
person. Hawkins, supra note 11, at 239. 
And the harm prevented must be caused by natural, not human, forces. See, United States 
v. Micklus, 581 F.2d 612, 615 (7th Cir. 1978); State v. Olsen, 99 Wis.2d 572, 299 N.W.2d 632, 
634 (1980); W. LAFAVE & A. Scorr, supra note 12, § 50, at 381. One writer has suggested that 
this restriction precludes the application of the necessity defense to deprogramming cases: 
"The 'deprogramming' situation is obviously of human origin, not created by the weather or a 
natural catastrophe, and, consequently, the 'necessity' defense is incorrectly invoked in such 
actions." Note, supra note 4, 11 SUFFOLK L. REV. at 1048. 
In addition, the value choice made by the actor cannot be foreclosed by a deliberate legisla-
tive choice, MODEL PENAL CODE§ 3.02, Comment l(b) (Tent. Draft No. 8, 1958), or be based 
on moral opposition to the statute, see generally Note, supra note 19, 48 U. CIN. L. REV. at 508. 
Nor can the actor's predicament be a result of his own negligence. See Sansom v. State, 390 
S.W.2d 279,280 (Tex. Crim. App. 1965) (court rejected defendant's claim that he took control 
of car, while drunk, for purpose of parking it, because the defendant's predicament was "of his 
own doing"); 1 R. ANDERSON, WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE§ 171 (1957). 
But see Woods v. State, 121 S.W.2d 604,605 (Tex. Crim. App. 1938) ("Nor do we believe that 
one, though negligently causing a collision, who receives injuries himself which would require 
treatment and medical attention, would be required to render aid to another . • • ."). 
45. See Fletcher, supra note 19, at 1368 (''The fact is that we need a set of three defenses 
... [one of which would] cover the cases on nonculpable reactions to situations of danger."). 
Salmond argued some time ago that the necessity rubric covered any "motive adverse to the 
law, and of such exceeding strength as to overcome any fear that can be inspired by the threat 
of legal penalties • . . . Where threats are necessarily ineffective,·-they should not be made, 
and their fulfillment is the infliction of needless and uncompensated evil." J. SALMOND, Ju-
RISPRUDENCE 406 (7th ed. 1924). Nevertheless, Salmond concluded that the practical and evi-
dentiary difficulties of implementing this theoretical position justified restricting the scope of 
the defense and limiting the effect of the defense to mitigation rather than excuse. Id at 407. 
46. This is not surprising given that most courts look at the defense as having a singular 
purpose (although their view of this purpose may vary). But see United States v. Randall, 104 
Daily Wash. L. Rep. 2249 (D.C. Super. Ct. 1976) (recognizing two distinct views of necessity). 
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mon stipulation that the existence of evils is judged by the subjective 
perception of the actor47 and many of the limits that courts have 
placed on the defense48 undercut the utilitarian ideal. The refusal to 
exculpate actors who make normative mistakes49 and other require-
ments that effectively preclude the defense despite the actor's desire 
to prevent a greater evil50 undercut the nonculpability rationale. 
And the unitary approach completely ignores the idea that society 
may wish to exculpate actors who respond to unusually demanding 
circumstances precisely as most members of society would respond. 
The inability of the unitary approach to encompass all of the di-
verse situations in which the policies underlying the necessity de-
fense support withholding punishment justifies the recognition of 
two distinct defenses.51 The first, which this Note will refer to as the 
"choice of evils" defense, would exculpate actors whose conduct rea-
sonably appeared necessary to prevent a greater evil. The second, 
which the Note will term the "compulsion" defense,52 would excul-
pate actors whose conduct resulted from unusually demanding cir-
cumstances that would cause a person of reasonable firmness to 
respond similarly. s3 
B. The "Choice of Evils" Defense 
Before accepting a choice of evils defense, courts should require 
defendants to demonstrate54 an honest and reasonable belief that 
(1) their conduct was necessary to prevent a harm from occurring; 
(2) the harm likely to be avoided clearly outweighed the harm likely 
to be caused; and (3) there existed no reasonable alternative to vio-
lating the law. The availability of this reformulated defense would 
tum primarily on the reasonableness of the defendant's belief in ne-
cessity, but the defense is not without limits. 
47. One court has been troubled by this inconsistency. In United States v. Mowat, 582 
F.2d 1194 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 967 (1978), the court questioned the requirement 
that the facts be judged subjectively, suggesting that this approach was arguably inconsistent 
with the defense's purpose of insuring that the greater evil be avoided. 582 F.2d at 1208, n.14. 
48. See note 44 supra and notes 62-78 infra. 
49. See note 22 supra and notes 62-66 infra. 
SO. See note 44 supra and notes 67-82 infra. 
51. A growing number of commentators are recognizing that courts should abandon the 
unitary approach to necessity. See Huxley, supra note 11, at 144; Comment, 67 CALIF. L. Rev. 
1183, 1200 (1979); Note, Just!ftcation: The Impact of the Model Penal Code on Statuto,y Re-
form, 15 CoLUM. L. Rev. 914, 921 (1975). The German Penal Code has recognized a dual 
notion of necessity. Section 35 STGB, quoted in Eser, supra note 16, at 636-37 n.81; § 34 
STGB, quoted in-Eser,..szpm_note 16, at 634 n.65. 
52. Although the Note uses the term "compulsion," the defense does not incorporate any 
belief that the defendant did not act of his own free will. 
53. In many ways the proposed compulsion defense resembles a liberalized duress defense. 
See notes 98-115 infra and accompanying text. 
54. The burden of proof in necessity cases has been placed on the defendant. See, e.g., 
United States v. Randall, 104 Daily Wash. L. Rep. 2249, 2254 (D.C. Super. Ct. 1976). 
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The requirement that defendants demonstrate a reasonable belief 
that the harm likely to be avoided outweighed the harm likely to be 
caused comports with the traditional fiction that an individual facing 
an inevitable choice acts as an agent of the legislature. 55 A purely 
subjective belief that the harm avoided outweighed the harm caused 
would not justify application of the choice of evils defense. For ex-
ample, the defense would not avail an actor who destroyed draft 
records to avoid the harms associated with a war that he believed 
immoral. This limitation, which is common to both the unitary ap-
proach and this Note's proposal, is based on the belief that courts 
should confine the necessity defense to circumstances that, if consid-
ered, would have been exempted from the law.56 If the legislature 
has explicitly decided the value choice that confronts an actor, he 
cannot claim that he violated the statute to avert a greater evil. 57 
The proposed defense's further requirement that the harms to be 
avoided reasonably appear clearly to outweigh the harms caused 
comports with the notion that we live in a society of laws, and checks 
individual discretion to modify those laws. One could argue, as have 
the drafters of the Model Penal Code,58 that actors should violate 
laws whenever it reasonably appears that the costs of obedience mar-
ginally outweigh the costs of violation. But such a standard would 
undermine citizens' respect for the law,59 and courts should weigh 
55. The tacit assumption, of course, is that the legislature would approve actions that bring 
about the "greater good," even if this requires violating the literal letter of the law. See M. 
KADISH & s. KADISH, supra note 22, at 124: 
Instead of including the defense by specifying the particular circumstances in which the 
defense exists, the law may delegate authority to the courts to find a defense made out in 
terms of some broadly stated policy or principle. The legislature has gone as far as it can 
( or will) in defining the special circumstances of nonliability appropriate to the ends of its 
legislation. The task of defining others it remits to the courts on an ad hoc 'basis as the 
cases arise. It is in this sense that the lesser-evil defense may be said to be included in the 
law. The law includes the requirement that the courts assess whether breaching the rule 
was preferable to complying with it in the circumstances. 
56. See, e.g., State v. Goff, 79 S.D. 138, 141-42, 109 N.W.2d 256, 257-58 (1961) (court 
inferred that legislature must have intended exception in statute). 
57. Perhaps the foremost justification for this limitation is that it is preferable to have 
decisions made through democratic processes than by private individuals. It is only when the 
democratic system has failed to consider the precise issue that we should encourage private 
decision-making. And the risk of undermining respect for the law is particularly great where 
we allow individuals to override an explicit declaration of the legislature. 
58. MODEL PENAL CODE§ 3.02 (Proposed Official Draft, 1964). Thus, under the Model 
Penal Code, one is justified in taking one life if more than one life is thereby saved. For such 
purposes the Code commands that all lives are to be considered of equal worth. MODEL PENAL 
CODE § 3.02, Comment 3 (Tent. Draft No. 8, 1958). 
59. The risks of encouraging citizens to violate the law when it is "justified" were discussed 
in Nation v. District of Columbia, 34 App. D.C. 453 (1910). In Nation, the court affirmed a 
conviction of Carry Nation for smashing bottles of liquor that she alleged were being sold 
unlawfully. The court held that even if the sale was a nuisance and was illegal, private persons 
should not take the matter into their own hands: "Mob law can have no recognition in our 
system and should be sternly repressed in its beginning." 34 App. D.C. at 455. 
Similar concerns with citizens taking the law into their own hands have been expressed in 
civil disobedience cases. In United States v. Moylan, 417 F.2d 1002 (4th Cir. 1969), cert. de-
284 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 80:271 
this diminution of respect in the utilitarian balancing of evils.60 Ex-
ceptions to established laws are appropriate only where the "clearly 
outweighs" standard is satisfied.61 This pragmatic limitation on the 
proposed defense thus balances society's short-run interest in en-
couraging violations of the law when necessary to prevent a greater 
harm and society's long-run interest that actors not lightly violate its 
laws. 
The "clearly outweighs" standard serves another function as 
well: Courts can use this limitation to replace the traditional ap-
proach to normative mistakes.62 Currently, an actor may qualify for 
the necessity defense notwithstanding a reasonable factual mistake,63 
nied, 391 U.S. 910 (1970), the court affirmed the defendants' convictions for destroying records 
of the selective service organization. The court rejected the defendants' claim that their moral 
beliefs justified such action: "No legal system could long survive if it gave every individual the 
option of disregarding with impunity any law which by his personal standard was judged 
morally untenable. Toleration of such conduct would not be democratic, as appellants claim, 
but inevitably anarchic." 417 F.2d at 1009. The court in United States v. Cullen, 454 F.2d 386 
(7th Cir. 1971), rejected the same claim, arguing that "[a) simple rule, reiterated by a peacelov-
ing scholar, amply refutes appellants' arrogant theory of defense: 'No man or group is above 
the law.'" 454 F.2d at 392 (quoting United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 385 
(1947) (Rutledge, J., dissenting)). See United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113 (D.C. Cir. 
1972); Chase v. United States, 468 F.2d 131 (7th Cir. 1972); United States v. Simpson, 460 F.2d 
515 (9th Cir. 1972); United States v. Kroncke, 459 F.2d 697 (8th Cir. 1972); United States v. 
Berrigan, 283 F. Supp. 336 (D. Md. 1968). The necessity defense is rejected in these cases, 
because the actor is substituting his moral judgment for a moral judgment that has already 
been made by the legislature (in this case, that the Vietnam war and the draft were justified). 
The necessity defense has traditionally been applied in situations where the court believes the 
choice of evils facing the actor was not considered by the legislature, and had it been, the 
legislature would have created an exception to the law. See Note, supra note 19, 48 U. CIN. L. 
REV. at 514 (legislature has already made value judgment on abortion). 
60. Fletcher, supra note 16, at 1285-86, has discussed two distinct ways in which judges can 
balance the harms in necessity cases. First, they can balance the immediate costs and benefits 
that were apparent to the defendant at the time of his act. Second, they can consider the social 
consequences of acquitting the defendant for his act. For example, in prison cases this might 
include a consideration of the effect on prison discipline if the courts began to accept the 
necessity defense in these cases frequently. If the necessity defense is to be justified by utili-
tarian reasons, as in the case of justification necessity, courts should consider all the conse-
quences of a decision to acquit. See People v. Richards, 269 Cal. App. 2d 768, 778, 75 Cal. 
Rptr. 597, 604 (1969). 
61. G. GORDON, THE CRIMINAL LAW OF SCOTLAND 418 (2d ed. 1978), has stressed that 
the commission of a crime, in and of itself, has a negative value, and this should be considered 
in deciding the applicability of the necessity defense. He suggests that this requires that the 
harm avoided by the actor must be greater than the harm caused (to offset this negative value). 
However, he also points out that the view that " 'necessity should be limited to cases where the 
impending harm is out of all proportion to the harm done by the defendant may . . • set too 
high a standard .. .'." Id at 419 n.7 (quoting Law Commission Working Paper No. 55). 
This has, in fact, been the approach most courts have taken. Arnolds & Garland, supra 
note 11, at 294, have noted that "[i]n most necessity cases, the question of which evil is the 
lesser is really not in dispute" (i.e., it is not at issue unless the harm avoided was clearly 
greater). One court has specifically stated that necessity requires that the harm resulting from 
compliance with the law must have "significantly exceeded" the harm resulting from breach of 
the law. State v. Marley, 54 Hawaii 450, 472, 509 P.2d 1093, 1109 (1973). 
62. See note 22 supra. 
63. See W. LAFAVE & A. Scorr,supra note 12, at 386; Arnolds & Garland,supra note 11, 
at 295; Tiffany & Anderson, supra note 11, at 868. 
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but most courts reject the defense if the actor made a normative mis-
take and balanced the competing harms incorrectly.64 Actors thus 
run the risk that a court, sitting as "an ad hoc legislature,"65 will 
decide against them despite an honest and reasonable attempt to 
avoid what society would consider the graver harm.66 The proposed 
defense renders this limitation unnecessary. Because the defense re-
quires a reasonable belief that the harm likely to be avoided clearly 
outweighs the harm likely to be caused, actors will obey the law in 
marginal cases characterized by substantial uncertainty. 
The choice of evils defense would also permit the elimination of 
other limitations on the traditional approach. Although the pro-
posed defense retai.J?.s the requirement that there be no reasonable 
alternative to breaking the law,67 the "imminence" requirement68 
would be largely eliminated. Many courts, interpreting imminence 
as a temporal requirement, have limited the necessity defense to 
cases where the harm was about to occur. 69 This approach is 
grounded primarily in the notion that unless the harm is temporally 
imminent an unforeseeable event may prevent its occurrence or a 
reasonable alternative to violating the law may become available.70 
64. Thus it has been said: 
[A]lthough the defense of necessity is subjective as to facts, it is objective as to values. The 
selection of values cannot be left to the citizen. . . . [I]t is for the judge to decide 
whether, on the facts as they appeared to the defendant, a case of necessity in law was 
made out, and this in tum involves deciding whether, on a social view, the value assisted 
was greater than the value defeated. 
G. WILLIAMS, supra note 18, § 239, at 746. 
65. ALI, MINUTES OF THE COUNCIL 209 (1958), cited in M. KADISH & S. KADISH, supra 
note 22, at 124 n.85. 
66. This concept of reasonableness must include an evaluation based on the weight that 
society would give to the competing interests, rather than the individual's personal preferences. 
Although an individual may consider the "value" of his wife's life to be many times greater 
than that of any other life, society does not benefit by encouraging action based on this value 
judgment (although society may tolerate and excuse such a choice). This does not mean that 
the reasonable man will always balance evils correctly; it only means that the reasonable man 
will value them from society's perspective. There may be value choices on which reasonable 
minds could differ (although society has a particular preference), or situations of imminence 
that prevent a reasonable person from correctly balancing evils. See G. WILLIAMS, supra note 
18, § 73, at 209. In these circumstances, the actor's choice may be reasonable, albeit incorrect. 
67. See text at notes 53-54 supra. From a utilitarian perspective the key issue is what is.the 
most socially useful means available to avoid the injury. This allows courts to greatly favor 
legal means, as they would probably avoid the harmful consequences of the illegal action (e.g., 
disrespect for the law). It would not, however, require courts to force defendants to choose any 
legal alternatives regardless of the likelihood that the alternative is a reasonable substitute for 
the chosen action. 
68. See note 39 supra. 
69. See, e.g., Smith v. Green, 470 S.W.2d 565,568 (Mo. 1971), cert. deniea;·405 U.S. 1073 
(1972); State v. Graham, 201 Neb. 659, 662, 271 N.W.2d 456, 458 (1978). 
70. See W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, supra note 12, § 50(5). It has also been argued that the 
imminence requirement ensures that individuals will ~terpose their judgment against the leg-
islature's "only in cases of inescapable emergency." Fletcher, supra note 19, at 1366-67. And 
one writer has claimed that although imminence is not a theoretically essential limit on the 
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But a temporal imminence requirement is overly restrictive:71 Utili-
tarian principles justify prevention of a harm that appears reason-
ably likely to occur, regardless of its jmmioence. Courts should thus 
refuse to accord talismanic significance to a finding that the harm 
was not imminent; instead, they should regard imminence as one 
factor bearing on the reasonableness of an actor's perception that the 
harm likely to be avoided clearly outweighed the harm likely to be 
caused.72 
Restrictions on the source and nature of the harm avoided would 
also be lifted under this Note's approach. Some courts assume that 
natural harms are more truly unavoidable than harms threatened by 
human agents, 73 and allow the necessity defense only if the harm 
avoided arose from a natural source.74 This distinction may be 
sound, but courts can more rationally incorporate it into the choice 
of evils defense by treating it as another factor relating to the reason-
ableness of the actor's perception of the need to violate the law.75 
Other jurisdictions restrict the defense to cases where an actor sought 
to prevent a particular type of harm (ie., serious bodily injury).76 
According to the drafters of the Model Penal Code, however, the 
principle that society benefits from avoidance of greater harm is one 
of general validity.77 If the defendant reasonably believed that the 
harm to be avoided clearly outweighed the harm likely to be caused 
defense, it can be tolerated as "simply an a priori balance of pertinent factors, a balance to 
which each citizen is bound." Robinson, supra note 16, at 280 n.53. 
71. The unwarranted restrictiveness of the imminence requirement has been criticized by 
legal scholars. See, e.g., Tiffany & Anderson,supra note 11, at 845-46; Note, supra note 51, at 
926-27. There has been a "trend ... to relax traditional notions of immediacy." Brief for 
Respondent at 44, United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394 (1980). 
72. Imminence is relevant to probability, insofar as harms about to occur are, generally, 
more likely to occur than those in the future. Imminence might also be defended as relevant 
because of the possibility that actors faced with an immediate harm are more likely to react 
emotionally (i.e., because of the pressure of having to make a quick decision), than actors 
facing an equally serious and probable harm in the future. 
73. See Gardner, supra note 19, at 132. 
14. See note 44supra. 
75. The categorical application of the nature/human source distinction has been receiving 
increasing criticism. See Iowa v. Reese, 272 N.W.2d 863,866 (Iowa 1978); Glazebrook,supra 
note 11, at 88-89. Tiffany & Anderson, supra note 11, at 857, indicate that codifications of 
necessity "virtually universal[ly]" reject this distinction. 
16. See Wis. STAT. § 939.47 (1977) (limiting the necessity defense to situations involving 
the prevention of "public disaster, or imminent death, or great bodily harm"). 
77. There are no restrictions on the type of harm that can be imposed or the source of the 
harm that can be prevented. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.02 (Proposed Official Draft, 1962). 
Comment 3 to § 3.02 states: 
We see no reason why the scope of the defense ought to be limited to cases where the evil 
sought to be avoided is death or bodily injury or any other specified harm; nor do we see a 
reason for excluding cases where the actor's conduct portends a particular evil, such as 
homicide. 
MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.02, Comment 3 (Tent. Draft No. 8, 1958). 
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and has satisfied the other requirements of the defense, he should be 
acquitted, regardless of the type of harm avoided. 
A third restriction on the type of harm avoided is also inconsis-
tent with the policies underlying the proposed defense. Many courts 
have rejected the necessity defense where the situation that faced the 
actor resulted from his own negligence. 78 The rationale for these 
holdings is unclear.79 Society may have an interest in punishing the 
original negligent conduct, but encouraging actors to take reasonable 
steps to prevent the greater evil once a dilemma has arisen furthers 
the utilitarian goal of the necessity defense. Where actors would be 
liable in tort for the greater harm caused by their negligence, this 
restriction may not deter socially desirable conduct. 80 But eliminat-
ing the requirement would benefit society where an actor's negli-
gence is the "cause in fact" of a greater harm, but not the "proximate 
cause" necessary to establish tort liability.81 Therefore, if a previ-
ously negligent actor chooses properly between two evils, the severity 
of the punishment that he receives should not exceed that warranted 
for his initial negligence. 82 
Courts adopting this Note's approach to necessity would also re-
fuse to impose categorical restrictions on the types of harm that ac-
tors can cause to prevent a greater evil. Some courts, for example, 
hold that the necessity defense is never available in cases involving 
the taking of innocent lives. 83 Society may have an interest in coun-
tering the belief that killing is an appropriate solution to problems, 84 
but most commentators reject this position.85 From society's per-
spective, killing some people to save a greater number may be pref-
erable when an actor confronts a situation in which some people 
must inevitably die.86 
78. See note 44 supra. 
79. See Tiffany & Anderson, supra note 11, at 865. 
80. Actors who would be liable for their negligence may well decide to risk criminal liabil-
ity for causing the lesser harm necessary to avoid the consequences of their negligence. 
81. For a comparison of various statutory formulations that differ in their treatment of the 
effect of an actor's prior fault and an evaluation of the desirability of such approaches, see 
Note, Justification: The Impact of The Model Penal Code on Statutory Reform, 75 COLUM. L. 
REV. 914, 928 (1975). 
82. See Tiffany & Anderson, supra note 11, at 865-66; MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.02, Com-
ment le (fent. Draft No. 8, 1958). 
83. See note 44 supra. This categorical restriction proceeds from the Kantian propositiqn 
that human life can never properly be used merely as a'llleans to an end. See I. KANT, Meta-
physical Foundation of Morals, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF KANT 178 (C. Friedrich ed. 1949) ("Act 
so as to treat man, in your own person as well as in that of anyone else, always as an end, never 
merely as a means."). Blackstone believed that a man "ought rather to die himself, than es-
cape by the murder of an innocent." 4 w. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 29 (1854) (1st ed. 
Oxford 1765). 
84. See, e.g., R. PERKINS, supra note 16, at 960. 
85. Tiffany & Anderson, supra note 11, at 860. 
86. This conclusion follows readily from utilitarian principles, given the assumption that 
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Where an actor violates a law in either a successful or an unsuc-
cessful attempt to avoid a greater harm than that caused by the vio-
lation, the proposed choice of evils defense produces more desirable 
results than the unitary approach. By considering primarily the rea-
sonableness of the defendant's belief in necessity, the revised defense 
better advances the utilitarian and nonculpability policies that un-
derlie the necessity defense in such situations. And the proposal's 
"clearly outweighs" standard should also mollify courts that con-
sider a choice of evils defense limitless. At the same time, this prag-
matic limitation and the other restrictions built into the suggested 
defense render unnecessary the unsound categorical limits that 
courts have imposed under the traditional formulation of the neces-
sity defense. 
C. The "Compulsion" .Defense 
To qualify for the proposed compulsion defense, a defendant 
must establish that (1) he harbored an honest and reasonable belief 
that there existed a risk of death or serious injury to himself or to 
someone close to him; and (2) under the circumstances, individuals 
of.ordinary firmness and respect for the law would have violated the 
law to avoid the threatened injury. 87 The compulsion defense at-
tempts to address in a principled manner those cases in which an 
actor violates a law to avoid a harm that he knows society considers 
less grave than the harm caused. The defense thus responds to an 
apparent paradox: In some situations most, if not all, members of 
all lives are of equal value. The Model Penal Code prescribes that all lives should be consid-
ered equally valuable. See MODEL PENAL CODE§ 3.02, Comment 3 (Tent. Draft No. 8, 1958), 
87. The defense should be denied to an actor who intentionally or recklessly placed him-
self in a situation in which it was reasonably foreseeable "that he would be subjected to a 
degree of coercion equal to or greater than that actually exerted, and that he would be required 
to commit an offense at least as serious as the one actually committed." Note, The Proposed 
Penal Law of New York, 64 CoLUM. L. REV. 1469, 1507 (1964). 
This stipulation is primarily designed to prevent leaders of criminal organizations from 
immunizing their underlings via threats. This concern was expressed in United States v. Vigo!, 
28 F. Cas. 376 (C.C.D. Pa. 1795), where the court warned that "it would be in the power of 
every crafty leader of tumults and rebellion, to indemnify his followers by uttering previous 
menaces." 28 F. Cas. at 376-77. To check this possibility, New York's Penal Code provides 
that the "defense of duress as defined in ... this section is not available when a person inten• 
tionally or recklessly places himself in a situation in which it is probable that he will be sub-
jected to duress." N.Y. PENAL LAW§ 40.00 (2) (McKinney 1975). 
This approach has been criticized because it precludes the defense for an actor who might 
have anticipated some small degree of coercion, but could not have anticipated the greater 
degree of coercion actually exerted. Note, supra, at 1507. To require, however, that the actor 
must anticipate that this greater degree of coercion would probably be exerted goes too far. 
For example, there are few, if any, situations in which an actor would anticipate that he would 
probably be threatened with death; even in the Mafia such a perception is questionable. 
Hence, confining the limitation to cases of probable duress would defeat the policy that justi-
fies imposition of this limitation. The approach suggested here is a compromise position, re-
flecting the legitimate concern expressed in the Columbia Note, but at the same time providing 
a more meaningful limitation on the defense. 
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society will break laws that they generally support to avert a lesser 
evil.88 
The principle underlying the proposed defense - that society 
should not punish actors who behave as other persons would behave 
under the pressure of similar circumstances89 - is neither unlimited 
nor novel. One could argue that all human behavior is compelled by 
circumstances - either genetic or environmental - over which the 
individual has no control.90 Our legal system rejects this argument, 
and instead presumes that individuals can withstand the pressure of 
circumstances and conform their behavior to the law's require-
ments.91 Where this capacity is utterly lacking, punishment is not 
imposed. Thus, insane individuals are exculpated, and the defense 
of involuntariness exculpates actors who serve as the unwilling or 
unwitting agents of others.92 
But the line that the legal system draws between these actors and 
individuals who retain the ability to choose between obeying and 
breaking the law is not unwavering. The law also recognizes that 
external pressures may reduce an actor's criminal responsibility even 
though he did not wholly lack capacity and was capable of obeying 
the law. For example, provocation may reduce what would other-
wise be murder to manslaughter.93 This defense does not completely 
exculpate defendants because the law assumes that, although the 
provocation would affect reasonable individuals and reduce their 
criminal responsibility, it would not affect them to such a degree that 
killing is an excusable response.94 The duress defense also recog-
88. See G. WILLIAMS, TEXTBOOK OF CRIMINAL LAW 579 (1978) ("Surely the jury are not 
to be asked whether it was moral for the defendant to give way to the threat. . . . He is 
acquitted not because he has chosen a lesser evil but because it is unlikely that the law's threats 
can serve a useful purpose in the circumstances.") (emphasis in original). 
89. See note 30 supra. 
90. See, e.g., B. SKINNER, SCIENCE AND HUMAN BEHAVIOR 6-7, 115-16 (1953); Bleech-
more, The Denial of Responsibility as a General Defense, 23 ALA. L. REV. 237 (1971). 
91. See. e.g., United States v. Bailey, 585 F.2d 1087, 1118 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (Wilkey, J., 
dissenting) ("It is a basic precept in Anglo-American law that the exercise of 'free' will is 
essential to criminal responsibility."), revd, 444 U.S. 394 (1980); D.P.P. v. Lynch, (1975) A.C. 
653, 689 (Lord Simon) ("[T)he law also accepts generally as an axiom the concept of the free 
human will - that is, a potentiality in the conscious mind to direct conscious action - specifi-
cally, the power of choice in regard to action."). Moreover, the law "assumes that free will 
exists equally in all persons and to an extent sufficient to conform to the normative prescrip-
tions established by society." M. BASSIOUNI, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW 158 (1978). 
92. For illustrations of cases in which convictions were reversed because the defendant did 
not act voluntarily, see Brinig, The Mistake of Fact Defense and the Reasonableness Require-
ment, GEO. MAsoN u. L. REV. 209, 211 n.5 (1978). 
93. See, e.g., W. LAFAVE & A. Scorr, supra note 12, § 76, at 573. 
94. Arguably duress only reduces, but does not eliminate, the responsibility of the actor. If 
this view were accepted, duress, like provocation, might be treated as a ground for mitigation, 
but not exculpation of the crime. New Jersey has taken a middle approach, providing that 
duress mitigates murder to manslaughter, but exculpates all other crimes. State v. Toscano, 74 
NJ. 421, 440 n.12, 378 A.2d 755, 764 n.12 (1977). This approach could be justified by the 
assumption that while the actor's capacity is sufficiently diminished to deny responsibility for 
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nizes the effects of external pressures,95 and that, in some situations, 
human threats may so overwhelm an actor's ability to resist that he 
should be exculpated for his subsequent conduct.96 Courts allow the 
duress defense not because actors facing illegal threats lack free will, 
but rather because the pressure on actors to make an "unreasonable" 
choice is so great that their violations are "understandable."97 
The proposed compulsion defense shares much in common with 
the traditional formulation of the duress defense. The duress 
defense exculpates defendants who violate the law in a man-
ner demanded98 by another individual,99 in response to a specific 
most acts, it is not so diminished that the actor does not have the capacity to appreciate the 
wrongfulness of killing a human being. 
95. See People v. Terry, 30 Ill. App. 3d 713, 715, 332 N.E.2d 765, 767 (1975); People v. 
Rodriguez, 30 Ill. App. 3d 118, 120 (1975). 
96. Many scholars have taken the view that the basis for the defense is that the individual's 
will was overcome. See, e.g., Fletcher, "Sllpra note 16, at 1288; and Newman & Weitzer, supra 
note 32, at 123-24. Newman and Weitzer suggest: 
If a person commits an act under compulsion, responsibility for the act cannot be ascribed 
to him since, in effect, it was not his own desire or motivation, or will, which led to the act. 
Punishment of the actor would be misdirected and futile since it would deter neither him 
nor others, if all were equally compelled to do acts outside of their own control. Thus, the 
law has reasoned that where it can be shown that a man acted under a compulsion which 
deprived him of his free will, he should not be held responsible for his act. This, in 
essence, is the thinking that lies behind the formulation of the duress doctrine. 
Id at 123-24. Similar terminology has been used by many courts. See, e.g., United States v. 
Bailey, 585 F.2d 1087, 1096 (D.C. Cir. 1978), revd, 444 U.S. 394 (1980) ("negates the intent or 
voluntariness elements of an offense"); Castle v. United States, 347 F.2d 492, 494 (D.C. Cir. 
1964), cert. denied, 388 U.S. 915 (1967) ("an act committed under compulsion •.. is involun-
tary"); People v. Graham, 57 Cal. App. 3d 238,240, 129 Cal. Rptr. 31, 32 (1976) ("had only to 
raise a reasonable doubt he had acted in the exercise of his free will"); People v. Wester, 237 
Cal. App. 2d 232, 234, 46 Cal. Rptr. 699, 703 (1965) ("escaping against his will"); People v. 
Luther, 394 Mich. 619, 622, 232 N.W.2d 184, 187 (1975) ("duress overcomes the defendant's 
free will"); State v. Savoie, 67 N.J. 439, 455, 341 A.2d 598, 607 (1975) (duress as incapacity to 
act voluntarily); State v. Gann, 244 N.W.2d 746, 752 (N.D. Sup. Ct. 1976) ("remove the free 
will of the actor"); State v. Pearson, 15 Utah 2d 353, 354, 393 P.2d 390, 391 (1964) (rejecting 
duress because the "escape was the result of a voluntary decision"). 
This position has also been taken by the English and Irish courts. E.g., Regina v. Kray 
(Ronald), 53 Crim. App. 569, 578 (1969) ("ceased to be an independent actor"); Regina v. 
Hudson (1971] 2 Q.B. 202 (''will of the accused was overborne"); Attorney-General v. Whelan, 
[1934) I.R. 518,526 ("overbear the ordinary power of human resistance"). 
97. Regardless of the pressures on an actor, the actor is still capable of choosing to comply 
with the law. G. GORDON, supra note 61, at 417. If society withholds punishment, it is not 
because the actor was unable to choose to act within the law; rather, it is because society 
recognizes the pressures on the individual and considers the imposition of punishment on an 
individual responding to these pressures to be unjust. In actuality, this is similar to the view 
that the actor lacked free will, because it is a recognition that the actor only violated the law 
because of the presence of external pressures. The proper inquiry for courts is into the suffi-
ciency of these pressures and the understandability of the actor's response, rather than the 
actor's capacity for compliance with the law. See generally Newman & Weitzer, supra note 32, 
at 137 (suggesting that the "law must give up its present formulation of the duress doctrine. It 
must put aside the issues of free will altogether, profiting from its experiences with the concept 
and from the failure of this concept to serve desired purposes"). 
98. The existence of a coercer is a necessary implication of the requirement that the con-
duct be demanded. 
99. See United States v. Michelson, 559 F.2d 567 (9th Cir. 1977); Rhode Island Rec. 
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threat100 of imminent101 bodily injury102 to the defendant or a c,ose 
relative. 103 The threat must be one that a person of ordinary firm-
Center, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 177 F.2d 603, 605 (1st Cir. 1949); State v. Hom, 58 
Hawaii 252, 566 P.2d 1378 (1977); People v. Robinson, 41 Ill. App. 3d 526, 529, 354 N.E.2d 
117, 120 (1976); People v. Coogler, 35 Ill. App. 3d 176, 178, 340 N.E.2d 623, 624 (1975); State 
v. Jones, 2 Kan. App. 2d 220, 224, 577 P.2d 357, 360 (1978); State v. Disscini, 126 N.J. Super. 
565,569, 316 A.2d 12, 15 (App. Div. 1974), qffd., 66 N.J. 411, 331 A.2d 618 (1975) (per curiam); 
State v. Procter, 51 Ohio App. 2d 151, 158-59, 367 N.E.2d 908, 913-14 (1977). However, the 
Rhode Island Rec. Center court noted: 
[P]erhaps the law of coercion developed in a tough-minded age, and now-a-days its sever-
ity should be relaxed. Although we are not aware of any supporting authority, maybe we 
ought to hold that under the circumstances it could be found that the vague menace of 
future injury of some unspecified sort was enough to induce in Edward a well founded 
present fear of future death or serious physical harm. 
177 F.2d at 605. 
100. See United States v. Housand, 550 F.2d 818, 825 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 970 
(1977); Shannon v. United States, 76 F.2d 490, 493 (10th Cir. 1935); People v. Lo Cicero, 71 
Cal. 2d 1186, 1190, 80 Cal. Rptr. 913,916,459 P.2d 241, 244 (1969); People v. Robinson, 41 Ill. 
App. 3d 526, 527, 354 N.E.2d 117, 120 (1976); People v. Moon, 38 Ill. App. 3d 854, 350 N.E.2d 
179, 186-87 (1976); State v. Milum, 213 Kan. 581,582,516 P.2d 984,985 (1973); State v. Perry, 
565 S.W.2d 841, 843-44 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978); State v. Brown, 561 S.W.2d 388, 390 (Mo. Ct. 
App. 1978); State v. Palmieri, 93 N.J.L. 195, 200, 107 A. 408, 409 (Ct. Err. & App. 1919); 
Esquibel v. State, 91 N.M. 498,500,576 P.2d 1129, 1131 (1978); Burton v. State, 51 Tex. Crim. 
196, 201, 101 S.W. 226, 229 (1907). Contra, People v. Harmon, 53 Mich. App. 482, 486, 220 
N.W.2d 212, 214 (1974), q/fd., 394 Mich. 625, 232 N.W.2d 187 (1975) (suggesting that in deter-
mining imminence, court should consider "all the surrounding circumstances, including the 
defendant's opportunity and ability to avoid the feared harm"). 
IOI. See Johnson v. State, 379 A.2d 1129 (Del. 1977); Bavero v. State, 347 So. 2d 781 (Fla. 
App. 1977); Hill v. State, 135 Ga. App. 766, 219 S.E.2d 18 (1975); People v. Unger, 66 Ill. 2d 
333, 362 N.E.2d 310 (1977); People v. Hocquard, 64 Mich. App. 331, 236 N.W.2d 72 (1975); 
Esquibel v. State, 91 N.M. 498, 576 P.2d 1129 (1978); State v. Crews, 17 N.C. App. 141, 193 
S.E.2d 317, 318 (1972); State v. Procter, 51 Ohio App. 2d 141, 378 N.E.2d 908 (1977). 
102. It is not at all clear what parties, if any, can be threatened other than the actor. It has 
been suggested that "the determination . . • depends upon such factors as the relationship 
between accused and the person threatened or injured, the communication of such threats or 
injury to accused, etc. The few cases in point exhibit varying results in view of the individual 
facts and circumstances shown." Annot., 40 A.L.R.2d at 917 (1955). Commentators think that 
~the defense is not limited to threats directed at the defendants. See Hersey & Avins, Compul-
sion as a .Defense to Criminal Prosecutions, 11 OKLA. L. REV. 283, 286 (1958). 
Although the cases on point are sparse, this view is supported by the case law. See, e.g., 
United States v. Gamer, 529 F.2d 962 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 850 (1976) (duress 
defense applied even though threat was to defendant's daughter); United States v. Gordon, 526 
F.2d 406, 408 n.l (9th Cir. 1975) (dictum) (threats to family ''would probably suffice" but 
threats to persons not related to the defendant would suffice only in "strong, dramatic and 
convincing" cases); United States v. Stevison, 471 F.2d 143 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 950 
(1973) (coercion defense rejected, but not on ground that threat was to daughter); Rhode Is-
land Rec. Center, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 177 F.2d 603, 606-07 (1st Cir. 1949) (Magru-
der, J., concurring) (suggesting that coercion might be used in circumstances where there was 
threat to another, particularly to a close relative); State v. Toscano, 74 N.J. 421, 437, 378 A.2d 
755, 763 (1977) (dictum) (suggesting that threats to "another person, such as a spouse or child, 
whose safety means more to the threatened person than his own well being" might be suffi-
cient). In several cases, courts have explicitly rejected such claims, but these decisions were 
based on the specific language of an applicable state statute. See Peopl_e v. Jones, 105 Cal. 
App. 3d 1, 164 Cal. Rptr. 124, 134-35 (1980). 
103. See, e.g., Nall v. Commonwealth, 208 Ky. 700,271 S.W. 1059 (1925); Commonwealth 
v. Reffitt, 149 Ky. 300, 148 S.W. 48 (1912); State v. Toscano, 74 N.J. 421, 378 A.2d 755 (1977). 
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ness would be unable to resist, 104 and cannot arise from the defend-
ant's own negligence.105 If the defendant ignored a reasonable 
opportunity to avoid the illegal conduct without undue risk of death 
or injury, the duress defense is unavailable. 106 The duress defense is 
also inapplicable in murder prosecutions, 107 and may be available 
only if the crime committed is a lesser evil than the threatened 
harm.108 These similarities are not surprising: Many commentators 
view duress as a subset of necessity, 109 and courts often confound the 
two defenses. 110 
The narrowness of the duress defense, however, prevents defend-
ants from relying on it in many situations where the theories under-
lying the necessity defense suggest that punishment may be 
inappropriate. Because duress is limited to cases involving human 
threats, it does not avail actors who were "compelled by the circum-
stances."111 The compulsion defense proposed here recognizes that 
104. See People v. Rodriguez, 30 Ill. App. 3d I 18, 332 N.E.2d 194 (1975); State v. Patter-
son, I 17 Or. 153, 241 P. 977 (1925). 
105. See United States v. Boomer, 571 F.2d 543 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 91 I 
(1978); United States v. Gordon, 526 F.2d 406 (9th Cir. 1975); Shannon v. United States, 76 
F.2d 490 (10th Cir. 1935); Rhode Island Rec. Center, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 177 F.2d 
603 (1st Cir. 1949); People v. Tallent, 89 Cal. App. 2d 158, 200 P.2d 214 (1948); People v. 
Villega!, 29 Cal. App. 2d 658, 85 P.2d 480 (1938). 
106. See Hersey & Avins, supra note 102, at 284. 
107. See, e.g., R. PERKINS, supra note 16, at 95. 
108. This approach to analyzing duress situations was advocated by Hersey & Avins, supra 
note 102, at 291. Judge Wilkey, in his dissent in United States v. Bailey, 585 F.2d 1087 (D.C. 
Cir. 1978), took this attitude toward duress, explaining: 
[T]he rationale for the defense is not that the defendant, faced with the unnerving threat 
of harm unless he does an act which violates the literal language of the criminal law, 
somehow loses his mental capacity to commit the crime in question. Rather, it is that, 
although a defendant has the mental stale which the crime requires, his conduct which vio-
lates the literal language of the criminal law is excused or justified because he has thereby 
avoided a harm of greater magnitude. 
585 F.2d at I lII (emphasis in original). 
109. See W. LAFAVE & A. Scarr, supra note 12, § 50, at 383: 
The defense of necessity is, of course, clearly related to that of duress ( or coercion), where 
the pressure on the defendant's will comes from human beings rather than from physical 
circumstances. It is generally regarded as a separate defense, but it would doubtless be 
possible to treat it as a branch of the law of necessity. 
See also Fletcher, supra note 16, at 1288-89. 
I IO. See United States v Bailey, 585 F.2d 1087, I I I I (D.C. Cir. 1978) (Wilkey, J., dissent• 
ing) ("Whether or not [the necessity and duress defenses] are actually distinct, they have been 
hopelessly commingled in case law.") (footnote omitted), revd, 444 U.S. 394 (1980); Common• 
wealth v. Thurber, - Mass.-, 418 N.E.2d 1253, 1256 (1981). 
II I. Actors confronting circumstances arising from nature have to rely on the necessity 
defense. However, because necessity is limited to situations where actors make a reasonable 
choice, it is not a satisfactory defense for actors who concede the unreasonableness of their 
choice, but assert that the choice was understandable given the external pressures. The ab-
sence of an adequate defense for such actors is unjustified. Just as the law recognizes in duress 
cases that external pressures from human sources can excuse unreasonable decisions, it should 
recognize the effects of these pressures when their origin is in nature. There is no a priori 
reason to believe that human threats are more compelling; to the contrary, if the rationale for 
limiting necessity to cases of natural origin is to be believed - i.e., human dangers are more 
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it is the nature of the interest threatened, and not the source or speci-
ficity112 of the threat, that generates the pressures that cause actors to 
violate the law. There is no reason to believe that illegal threats are 
more compelling than threats to the same interests that arise from 
other circumstances that the actor is powerless to change.113 The 
proposed defense also recognizes that the desire to avoid a nonim-
minent harm may be as compelling as the desire to avoid an immi-
nent harm.114 Under the new compulsion formulation, therefore, the 
fact-finder would consider the source of the threatened harm, its im-
minence, and the degree of certainty that the harm would occur as 
factors bearing on whether the defendant behaved as would an indi-
vidual of ordinary firmness, rather than as categorical restrictions on 
the availability of the defense. 115 
Much of the restrictive attitude toward duress can be attributed 
to confusion regarding the purpose of the defense116 and to the 
proclivities of a "tougher-minded age," 117 but there are valid reasons 
to limit a defense based on the pressure of circumstances. To pre-
vent the defense from exculpating all criminal behavior, 118 courts 
must impose some constraints on the types of circumstances that pro-
likely to be averted - exactly the opposite conclusion is warranted. The duress defense pro-
posed by the drafters of the Model Penal Code rejects many of the traditional limits on the 
duress defense, but retains the requirement that the defendant must have responded to an 
illegal threat made by another. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.09 (1) (Proposed Official Draft 
1962). 
112. See Note, Prison Escape and Defenses Based on Conditions: A Theory of Social Prefer-
ence, 61 CALIF. L. REV. 1183, 1187 (1979) (''The requirement that the threat prompting the 
defendant's escape be 'a specific threat of death, forcible attack, or substantial bodily injury' 
will often have no bearing on the defendant's danger.") (quoting People v. Lovercamp, 43 Cal. 
App. 3d 823, 831, 118 Cal. Rptr. 110, 114-15 (1974)) (emphasis deleted). 
113. See, e.g., G. FLETCHER, supra note 21, at 834: 
The slight reorientation required to expand the concept of duress is to shift one's focus 
away from the ''threat" and the "coercion" and toward the act that is impelled under the 
circumstances. The question should not be whether the actor can be fairly expected to 
resist human threats, but whether he can fairly expect to abstain from an act that seems 
required under the circumstances. 
114. See text at notes 67-72 supra. 
115. Some courts have allowed juries considerable discretion in determining the applica-
bility of the duress defense. See, e.g., People v. Harmon, 53 Mich. App. 482,486,220 N.W.2d 
212, 214 (1974), affd, 394 Mich. 625, 232 N.W.2d 187 (1975) (indicating that except in ''the 
clearest cases" questions of imminence are to be decided by the jury taking into consideration 
"all the surrounding circumstances."); State v. Toscano, 74 N.J. 421, 442, 378 A.2d 755, 765 
(1977) ("In charging the jury ... the trial judge should advert to this factor of immediacy, as 
well as the gravity of the harm threatened, the seriousness of the crime committed, the identity 
of the person endangered, the possibilities for escape or resistance and the opportunities for 
seeking official assistance. He should also emphasize that the applicable standard for judging 
the defendant's excuse is the 'person of reasonable firmness in [the defendant's] situation.' "). 
116. See State v. Toscano, 74 N.J. 421, 436, 378 A.2d 755, 762 (1977). 
117. Rhode Island Rec. Center, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 177 F.2d 603, 605 (1st Cir. 
1949). 
118. Concern over the possible effects of removing the rigid restrictions that have been 
imposed on exceptions to the free will assumption was expressed in United States v. Bailey, 
585 F.2d 1087, 1120-21 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (Wilkey, J., dissenting), revd, 444 U.S. 394 (1980). 
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vide a legally recognized excuse. And society's interest in deterring 
illegal conduct may also justify limiting the scope of the defense. 
Although the ability of criminal sanctions to deter "compelled" con-
duct has been questioned, 119 in most cases there is at least a possibil-
ity that sanctions will have some deterrent value.120 Over time, 
punishment might indirectly deter socially undesirable conduct by 
raising the standard of reasonable behavior in the face of dire 
circumstances. 
These considerations, however, do not justify limitations, such as 
the human threat requirement, that are unrelated either to the quan-
tum of pressure on the actor or to the degree of resistance that soci-
ety requires of him. Society's purposes can be served by requiring 
that the actor be faced with circumstances threatening death or seri-
ous injury to himself or someone close to him. It is in these situa-
tions that actors are most likely to fail to make the socially desirable 
choice, and least likely to be deterred by the threat of criminal sanc-
tions.121 When lesser interests are threatened, or when the individ-
ual threatened is not close to the actor, unreasonable behavior is less 
likely to occur and punishment is more likely to deter. The proposed 
defense's limitation, therefore, corresponds more closely with both 
the typical individual's response to inevitable choice situations and 
society's need for restrictions on the defense than does the traditional 
human source requirement. 
Since courts applying the proposed defense would look not to the 
source of the threat, but to the amount of pressure that would cause 
an individual of ordinary firmness and respect for the law to violate 
the law, 122 it might be objected that the defense is standardless. 123 
119. See note 35 supra. 
120. The ability of the law to deter illegal conduct by people acting under duress is a long 
debated, but still unsettled, question. Stephen argued that "it is at the moment when tempta-
tion is strongest that the law should speak most clearly and emphatically to the contrary." 2 J. 
STEPHEN, supra note 3~, at 107. Others have responded that the law can never effectively offset 
a threat of imminent injury to an actor. If the actor is willing to incur the injury rather than 
violate the law, it will stem from "other motives than the fear of legal punishment." Arp v. 
State, 97 Ala. 5, 12, 12 So. 301, 303 (1893). These positions are not wholly inconsistent. In 
extreme cases (for example, a threat of immediate death), the law almost certainly has no 
deterrent- value. However, there are many pressures on individuals (even pressures great 
enough to compel an ordinary person to violate the law) that can probably be effectively coun-
tered on some occasions by a sufficiently severe sanction. The difficult question is whether the 
severity of the sanction required to offset the threat is so harsh that society would consider 
imposition of the sanction to be unjust. 
121. See note 35 supra. 
122. See D.P.P. v. Lynch, [1975] A.C. 653, 670 (Morris, L.J.); MODEL PENAL CODE§ 2.09, 
Co=ent (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1960); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-14 (West 1972); N.Y. 
PENAL LAW § 40.00 (McKinney 1975); Note, supra note 87, at 1506. 
123. The approach suggested here is actually far less discretionary than that suggested else-
where. Several scholars have suggested that in determining whether the duress was sufficient to 
excuse the actor's conduct, the court should focus on the particular capacities of the defendant, 
rather than employing standards such as ''the reasonable man." See Fletcher, supra note 16; 
Newman & Weitzer, supra note 32. 
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But juries undertake similar inquiries in many cases. 124 More im-
portant, the rigid guidelines of the current approach may belie its 
application in practice. If the law does not reflect the community's 
sense of justice, many cases will be screened out by police officers or 
prosecutors, or will result in acquittals because juries will temper the 
law's effect. 125 The proposed modification adds no discretion to the 
system, and is a more open approach for the law to take. 126 
Taken together, the compulsion and choice of evils defenses pro-
posed here would cover all three of the fact situations identified in 
the theoretical framework. Both defenses are limited by a concept 
that is central to criminal law - the reasonable man. They thus 
harmonize the current formulation of the necessity defense with gen-
erally accepted principles without departing radically from those 
principles. 
II. APPLICATION OF THE PROPOSED DEFENSES TO 
DEPROGRAMMING CASES 
A. .Deprogramming and the "Choice ef Evils" .Defense 
Actors may successfully advance the choice of evils defense only 
if they entertained an honest and reasonable belief that the harm 
likely to be avoided by deprogramminp; clearly outweighed the harm 
likely to be caused. 127 Several problems inhere in such a balancing 
process. First, the variety of cult practices, deprogramming thera-
pies, and experiences of individual cult members renders meaning-
124. For example, juries are entrusted with the task of deciding whether there is sufficient 
provocation to reduce a charge of murder to manslaughter. Similarly, cases involving a deter-
mination of negligence tum on an assessment of how a "reasonable man" would behave in a 
particular factual situation. See generally w. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LA w OF TORTS 
§ 32 (4th ed. 1971). 
125. See Arnolds & Garland, supra note 11, at 298. These informal methods of deciding 
controversies are particularly evident in deprogramming situations, where law enforcement 
officials have been extremely reluctant to impose punishment on parents. See Le Moult, supra 
note 4, at 608; Note, supra note 4, 53 N.Y.U. L. REV. at 1253 (''The element of scate action in 
self-help situations was passive: police declined to intervene, viewing the kidnappings as 'fam-
ily matters' best resolved outside the courts; grand juries refused to indict and petit juries to 
convict the abductors.") (footnotes omitted). 
126. As an alternative to exculpating defendants, courts might consider the defense out-
lined here to be simply a basis for mitigation of punishment. The justification for this i,ip-
proach would be that the perceived injustice of imposing penalties on actors who were 
influenced by substantial external pressures is outweighed by the need to deter illegal conduct. 
Bv making compulsion a basis for mitigation, courts would recognize that compelled actors are 
not as blameworthy as actors who violated the law without external pressures, but would also 
retain some penalty in the hope of deterring violations of the law. The same approach might 
be taken for actors who establish an "imperfect" compulsion defense -i.e., the pressures were 
sufficient to meet the first two tests suggested earlier, but the actor's response to the pressure 
was not understandable. Lafave and Scott have suggested that an actor killing under duress 
might be convicted of manslaughter rather than murder, and this approach has been followed 
in two state codes. See W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTT, supra note 12, at 585. 
127. See text following note 54supra. 
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less many general conclusions regarding the harms caused and 
avoided. 128 Second, average defendants may not fully appreciate the 
scope of the harms caused or may consider certain "harms" as 
avoided when, in legal contemplation, no "harm" exists. Reasonable 
normative mistakes129 of this kind should preclude punishment. 
This section attempts to address these problems. After surveying 
the possible harms caused and avoided by deprogramming, it con-
siders the possibility that the actor made a reasonable normative 
mistake. Finally, the section examines the relevance oflegal alterna-
tives to deprogramming. It concludes that the choice of evils defense 
will rarely avail defendants in deprogramming cases. 
I. Harms Caused 
Attempts to deprogram cult members are likely to cause two gen-
eral types of harms. 130 The most obvious is violation of the criminal 
laws that prohibit the various actions of deprogrammers. These 
criminal aspects of deprogramming vary little from case to case: 
Most deprogrammings involve abducting the cult member and con-
fining him for several days. 131 The range of crimes involved may 
thus be said "to involve kidnapping at the very least, quite often as-
sault and battery, almost invariably conspiracy to commit a crime, 
and illegal restraint." 132 Deprogrammers attempt to discount the 
magnitude of these harms by arguing that deprogramming is tempo-
rary and benevolently motivated.133 They also point to former cult 
members' thankful declarations as proof that deprogramming is, on 
balance, beneficial. 134 It is difficult, however, to appreciate the rele-
vance of such expressions of gratitude. 135 And neither its temporary 
128. Anthony, The Fact Pal/em Behind the .Deprogramming Controversy: An Analysis and 
anAltemative, 9 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 73, 80 (1980) ("Much of the disagreement 
about the mental health effects of the movements results because people are comparing en-
tirely different entities. One of the clearest generalizations that emerges from studies of these 
effects is that the mental health implications of unconventional religions vary tremendously 
from group to group."); Panel .Discussion, supra note 9, at I 16. 
129. See text at note 22 supra. 
130. Harms to the individual from deprogramming are discussed at note 180 iefra. 
131. See note 8 supra and accompanying text. For a more graphic description of the 
deprogramming process, see Affidavit of Walter Robert Tayler, In re Guardianship of Walter 
Tayler, No. P-76-1228 (Okla. Co. P. Ct. Aug. 12, 1978), reprinted in Deprogramming: Docu-
menting the Issue, supra note 8, at 65-67 ("My monastic clothes were ripped off me while four 
persons held me down. My cross or crucifix was taken away from me. . . . Mr. Howard 
discussed his sexual exploits and fornications and encouraged me to have sexual intercourse,"), 
132. T. PATRICK & T. DULACK, supra note 7, at 63. 
133. See T. PATRICK & T. DULACK, supra note 7, at 77. 
134. See, e.g. , Panel .Discussion, supra note 9, at 106 (statement of Marcia Rudin), Patrick 
claims a success rate of over 90% (with "success" presumably demonstrated by a decision not 
to return to the cult). Note, supra note 4, 15 NEW ENG. L. REV. at 152 n.147. Such claims are 
obviously highly self-serving, but, unfortunately, the accuracy of this estimate has not been 
objectively evaluated by researchers. 
135. The laws violated by deprogrammers, of course, do not function solely to protect cult 
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nature nor its benevolent purpose are legally acceptable justifications 
for criminal conduct.1J6 
Less obvious, but no less significant than the criminal violations, 
is the threat that deprogramming poses to freedom of religion. 137 
Most of the characteristics of cult membership on which deprogram-
mers rely to justify their activities - isolation from the rest of soci-
ety, devotion to the cult as a surrogate family, and adherence to 
peculiar beliefs and practices - are precisely those that give rise to 
first amendment interests.138 Because the dogma of most cults is 
"sincere and meaningful" and "occupies in the life of its possessor a 
place parallel to that filled by" conventional notions of a divine be-
ing, 139 the first amendment fully protects the beliefs and practices of 
cult members.140 Interference with those beliefs and practices di-
rectly affects deprogrammed individuals, and also harms the cults:141 
In addition to depriving cults of members' services and support, 
deprogramming may generate a chilling effect that hampers their 
members. See W. LAFAVE &A. Scorr,supra note 12, at 408. See also J. HALL,supra note 18, 
at 217. Moreover, these declarations may come from former cult members who have accepted 
the arguments of deprogrammers as a means of rationalizing their earlier involvement in the 
cult. See note 180 infra. 
136. See Part I, Section B supra. 
137. See, e.g., Co=ent, supra note 4, 13 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 751; Note, supra note 
4, 53 N.Y.U. L. REV. at 1248 n.8. 
138. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205,227 (1972) {holding that application to Amish 
sect of compulsory school attendance laws amounted to "severe interference with religious 
freedom"). In Yoder, the Court was careful to rely on the long history and apparent sincerity 
of the Amish sect, as well as the convincing demonstration that the sect's practices comple-
mented, rather than frustrated, the underlying purpose of compulsory school attendance laws. 
Nevertheless, it would be difficult to distinguish on a principled basis the Amish lifestyle from 
cult lifestyles. In both, "religion pervades and determines virtually [the] entire way of life, 
regulating it with the detail of the Talmudic diet through the strictly enforced rules of the 
church co=unity." 406 U.S. at 216. Further, the Court noted in Yoder that forcing the sect 
to conform with the law in question posed "a very real threat of undermining the Amish 
community and religious practice as it exists today; they must either abandon belief and be 
assimilated into society at large, or be forced to migrate to some other . . . more tolerant 
region." 406 U.S. at 218. The same observation can be made with respect to many modem 
day cults vis-a-vis deprogramming. 
139. United States v Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 176 (1965). 
140. See Torasco v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 493 (1961) (invalidating state statute requiring 
declaration of belief in God as condition for holding public office). 
141. The Supreme Court held long ago: ''The law knows no heresy, and is committed 
to the support of no dogma, the establishment of no sect. The right to organize voluntary 
religious associations to assist in the expression and dissemination of any religious doctrine 
... is unquestioned." Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 728-29 (1872), quoted in Ser-
bian Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 710-11 (1975). 
As a general matter, the Court has long viewed a group's constitutional rights as indistin-
guishable from that ofits members. See, e.g., Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477, 487-88 (1975); 
NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 431 (1963); Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 
(1957) (plurality). Interference with a cult member's practice of religious beliefs is, therefore, 
simultaneously an interference with the rights of the cult, because the rights of the cult and the 
cult member in connection with the free exercise of religious beliefs "are in every practical 
sense identical." NAACP v. Alabama ex rel Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 459 (1958). 
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recruiting efforts. 142 It is thus likely to injure substantially first 
amendment interests. 
The nature of the two interests threatened by deprogramming is 
such that courts should not allow the "success" of a particular at-
tempt to mitigate the harms caused. The laws that deprogrammers 
violate exist not only to protect individual cult members, but also 
because society has an interest in discouraging parents, friends, and 
deprogrammers from taking the law into their own hands regardless 
of the likelihood that they would succeed. As a practical matter, 
moreover, courts will encounter only cases where the deprogram-
ming failed. The difficulties in attempting to make a post hoc assess-
ment of the likelihood of success and the absence of objective data 
regarding success rates counsel against exculpating defendants on 
the basis of fact-specific inquiries into the likelihood that they would 
succeed.143 
2. Harms Avoided 
Although its proponents argue that deprogramming avoids a 
wide variety of evils, 144 one factor - the member's capacity to con-
sent to the harms alleged - significantly affects the weight that 
courts should give to them. Most of these evils necessitate interven-
tion only if the cult member was incapable of voluntarily assenting 
to them. No compelling reason supports the choice of evils defense 
where the member voluntarily chose to accept the cult's living condi-
tions.145 Indeed, there appear to be no necessity cases in which a 
party who sought to protect a third person from a voluntarily as-
sumed harm raised the defense. 146 Our society attaches great value 
to individual freedom, and deprogrammers impose substantial 
142. This sort of inquiry was specifically cited as one factor establishing the right of a civil 
rights group to assert the constitutional rights of its members in NAACP v. Alabama ex rel 
Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 459-60 (1958). 
143. Such an inquiry would require some objective data regarding the "success" rate of 
deprogramming. To date, only self-serving claims of success have been made by deprogram-
mers. See note 134 supra. 
144. For critical analyses of cults, see sources cited in note 4 supra. 
145. Certain consensual harms, however, may be serious enough to warrant intervention 
and justify application of the choice of evils defense. One can imagine, for example, the choice 
of evils defense being raised where the actor sought to prevent drug abuse or suicide. 
146. There are two cases that arguably present such a situation. In Leigh v. Gladstone, 26 
T.L.R. 139 (K.B. 1909), the court held that prison officers who forcibly fed a prisoner on a 
hunger strike to protect her health had acted lawfully. It has been suggested, however, that the 
benefit justifying this action was the need for prisOii disdpline, and hence the case "is not 
authority for any wider principle that injury may lawfuly be caused to save a person from 
himself." Glazebrook, supra note 11, at 99. See G. WILLIAMS, supra note 18, at § 234. In 
Humphries v. Connor, 17 Ir. C.L.R. 1 (Q.B. 1864), the defendant constable had removed an 
emblem from a person, because the emblem offended several persons nearby. The constable 
claimed that he removed the emblem to protect the wearer. The court acquitted the constable 
because "it was defendant's duty as a constable to preserve the public peace, and to prevent the 
breach of it by disturbance or otherwise." 17 Ir. C.L.R. at 6 (O'Brien, J.). Hence, the court 
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harms when they deprive cult members of their free choice. 147 
The belief that deprogramming avoids nonconsensual harms is 
based on the premise that consent requires simultaneous capacity 
and knowledge. 148 Cults may deceive potential members, and pre-
vent them from obtaining the knowledge required for consent. 149 
And some cults use manipulative techniques - frequently described 
as "coercieve persuasion," "thought control," or "brainwashing" -
that may prevent recruits from having the capacity to consent once 
they have been given sufficient information.150 The deprogrammers' 
primary argument, then, is that cults manipulate or brainwash re-
cruits into adhering to cult dogma.1s 1 
suggested that the benefit justifying intervention was the need for public order, rather than a 
specific need to protect the defendant. 
Glazebrook suggests that necessity is not applicable to rescuers who act against the consent 
of the rescued party. Glazebrook, supra note 11, at 98-99. Elsewhere it has been suggested 
that necessity would be applicable if a defendant prevented another person from attempting to 
commit suicide. 
147. See generally J. MILL, ON LIBERTY {London 1859). 
148. Delgado, supra note 4, at 49. 
149. C. STONER & J. PARKE, ALL Goo's CHILDREN 61 (1977) ("cult recruiters may care-
fully avoid or even deny the group is a religion"). But see Robbins, in Panel Discussion, supra 
note 9, at 95. 
150. See Delgado, supra note 4, at 54-56. 
151. See Delgado, Ascription of Criminal States of Mind: Towards a Defense Theory for the 
Coercively Persuaded ("Brainwashed'? Defendant, 63 MINN. L. REV. I, 1-6 (1978), for an at-
tempt to analyze the factors involved in coercive persuasion. For the most comprehensive 
treatment of the brainwashing argument as applied to cults, see Delgado, supra note 4. See 
also VERMONT GENERAL ASSEMBLY, REPORT OF THE SENATE COMMITTEE FOR THE INVESTI-
GATION OF ALLEGED DECEPTIVE, FRAUDULENT AND CRIMINAL PRACTICES OF VARIOUS OR-
GANIZATIONS IN THE STATE 5 (Jan. 1977) [hereinafter cited as VERMONT SENATE COMM.]. 
At least one "cult" has taken legal action in response to criticism in the popular press. 
Reverend Sun Myung Moon's Unification Church filed a libel suit that resulted in "one of the 
longest civil trials in recent British history." N.Y. Times, Apr. I, 1981, at 4, col. I. The paper 
had warned that the Church ''woos to its ways young people who walk out on their everyday 
lives, leave behind families in despair." A parent of a former Church member described the 
members as "robots, glassy-eyed and mindless, programmed as soldiers in this vast fund-rais-
ing army with no goals or ideas, except as followers of the half-baked ravings of Moon, who 
lived in splendor while his followers lived in forced penury." Id, at l, col. 2, and at 4, col. l. 
After hearing 117 witnesses during the five-month trial, the jury "ordered the group (i.e., the 
Unification Church) to pay court costs estimated at nearly $2 million [and] also unanimously 
reco=ended that the church's tax-free status 'be investigated by the Inland Revenue Depart-
ment on the grounds that it is a political organization.'" Id, at l, cols. 1-2. 
The brainwashing issue has also received judicial attention. In Peterson v. Sorlien, 299 
N.W.2d 123 (1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1031 (1981), the Minnesota Supreme Court rejected 
a cult member's false imprisonment claim against her parents because of the cult's coercive 
methods. 299 N.W.2d at 128-29. Another court seemed to accept the notion that brain-
washing was a ~~ibility in cult settings, but concluded that brainwashing was not actionable. 
People v. Murphy, 98 Misc. 2d 235, 243, 413 N.Y.S.2d 540, 545 (1977). See also Helander v. 
Unification Church, l Fam. L. Rep. 2797 (D.C. Super. Ct., Family Div. Sept. 23, 1975). Other 
courts have suggested that the evidence is not conclusive either way. See Turner v. Unification 
Church, 473 F. Supp. 367, 376 (D.R.!. 1978), ajfd, 602 F.2d 458 (1st Cir. 1979); Katz v. Supe-
rior Court, 73 Cal. App. 3d 952, 980-81, 141 Cal. Rptr. 234, 251 (1977). See also 123 CONG. 
REc. 27,091 (1977) (Department of Justice takes position that "evidence that sect members do 
not have the capacity to exercise a free will is inconclusive"). 
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The effectiveness of thought control techniques is poorly under-
stood, 152 but scholars are increasingly recognizing the possibility of 
manipulation.153 New recruits are often quite suggestible, 154 and the 
cult experience is frequently designed to reduce drastically the resist-
ance of recruits to indoctrination.155 As a result, cult leaders may 
substantially influence recruits' thinking.156 These factors led the 
New York Charity Frauds Bureau to conclude, after investigating 
152. See Reich, Brainwashing, Psychiatry, and the Law, 39 PSYCH. 400, 402-03 (1976); Sha-
piro, .Destructive Cultism, AM. FAM. PHYSICIAN, Nov. 1977, at 83 (suggesting that further re-
search on the prevention of "destructive cultism" and treatment is necessary). Doubt has also 
been expressed concerning the possibility of resolving questions about brainwashing in a 
courtroom. See Dressler, Professor .Delgado's "Brainwashing" .Defense: Courting a .Determinisl 
Legal System, 63 MINN. L. REV. 335, 354-56 (1979); Reich,supra. But see Delgado,supra note 
151, at 26-27. 
153. See sources cited in Delgado, supra note 151, at 1-3 nn.1-11 & 16. Delgado claims 
that the existence of thought control "is attested to by voluminous accounts of those who have 
experienced it, as well as reports of scientific investigators who have studied it. The body of 
professional literature related to thought reform is extensive." Id at 22-23 (footnotes omitted). 
154. Many recruits are experiencing emotional problems before becoming involved with 
the cult. See Clark, supra note 2, at 279-80. Some cults deliberately seek out emotionally 
disturbed individuals. Peterson v. Sorlien, 299 N.W.2d 123, 130 (Minn. 1980), cert. denied, 450 
U.S. 1031 (1981). Other recruits desire precisely the sort of lifestyle that cults appear to offer 
-an opportunity to devote their lives to God, to work for socially desirable causes, and to live 
in a communal setting. J. MAcCOLLAM, supra note 2, at 19. Their resulting eagerness to 
accept the cult's doctrine is increased by the friendliness and enthusiasm of the other members. 
See Levine, supra note 2, at 35; Lofland, "Becoming a World-Saver" Revisited, 20 AM. BEHAV• 
!ORAL Sci. 805, 811-13 (1977). The recruits' desire to be part of the group, at least for a few 
days, may prevent them from critically analyzing the doctrines to which they are exposed. 
155. The techniques used by cults include a rigorous daily routine desigoed to exhaust the 
recruits physically, Lofland, supra note 154, at 810, ceremonies desigoed to produce emotional 
euphoria, see, e.g., F. CONWAY & J. SPIEGELMAN, SNAPPING (1978), and deprivation of food 
and sleep,see T. PATRICK& T. DuLACK,supra note 7, at 75-76. Some cults go to great lengths 
to prevent recruits from spending any time alone because this would give them an opportunity 
to consider more carefully the information to which they are being exposed. Levine, supra 
note 2, at 35; Rudin, supra note 2, at 19. 
156. The cumulative effect of the cults' techniques may leave the recruits' minds in a state 
of dissociation. See F. CONWAY &J. SPIEGELMAN,supra note 155, at 184; Clark,supra note 2, 
at 280; Rudin, supra note 2, at 19-20. At this point, cult leaders can exert substantial influence 
over recruits' thinking. The leaders completely control the information that the recruits re-
ceive and the means of exposure. See generally Lofland, supra note 154, at 809-11. Recruits 
are encouraged to stop questioning the information and to accept the cult's doctrines and life-
style. F. CONWAY & J. SPIEGELMAN, supra note 155, at 57; Delgado, supra note 4, at 14. The 
recruits' identification with, and acceptance of, their new environment is also fostered by at-
tempts to isolate them from their past and the outside world. See Investigating the Effects of 
Some Religious Cults on the Health and Welfare of their Converts (statement of John Clark to 
the Vermont Senate Comm. for the Investigation of Alleged Deceptive, Fraudulent and Crimi-
nal Practices of Various Organizations in the State) (Aug. 18, 1976); Lofland, supra note 154, at 
810. After the recruits have accepted the cult, loyalty may be maintained by manipulating the 
members' feelings of guilt, see Levine, supra note 2, at 36; Rudin, supra note 2, at 26, and fear, 
see VERMONT SENATE CoMM., supra note 151; California Senate Select Comm. on Children 
and Youth, Hearing on the Impact of Cults on Today's Youth 27 (Aug. 24, 1974); Lofland, supra 
note 154, at 813; Singer, Coming Out of the Cults, PSYCH. TODAY, Jan. 1979, at 72, 79, and by 
establishing a very regimented lifestyle within which the member has little reason or opportu-
nity to question the cult, see Delgado, supra note 4, at 24; Singer, supra, at 76. Moreover, 
because new members have lost touch with the outside world, they may become psychologi-
cally dependent on the cult during their continued devotion. See Clark, supra note 2, at 280. 
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the Children of God, that the group had employed "brainwashing 
techniques" to accomplish "a total assault on the psyche" of its 
members.157 Similarly, the Minnesota Supreme Court, in rejecting a 
Way International member's claim that her deprogramming consti-
tuted false imprisonment, stated that the group's members suffered a 
"severe impairment of autonomy and ability to think 
independently."158 
Other scholars have challenged these views of the cult indoctrina-
tion process.159 They suggest that the cults' techniques do not di.ff er 
significantly from those of some traditional religions160 and other in-
stitutions.161 Critics of deprogramming also object to the use of 
terms such as "brainwashing" because acceptance of this view of 
conversion may rationalize religious persecution. 162 These scholars 
question the cults' ability to brainwash members, 163 and suggest that 
acceptance of a cult's lifestyle does not evince brainwashing: Many 
individuals may, consciously or subconsciously, seek out an authori-
157. NEW YORK ATTORNEY GENERAL, FINAL REPORT ON THE ACTIVITIES OF THE CHIL-
DREN OF Goo 3 I. 
158. Peterson v. Sorlien, 299 N.W.2d 123 (Minn. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1031 (1981). 
159. See Anthony, supra note 128, at 79; Robbins, Religious Movements, the State, and the 
Law: Reconceptualizing "the Cult Problem," 9 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 33 (1980); 
Robbins & Anthony, New Religions, Families and Brainwashing, SOCIETY, May-June 1978, at 
77-78; Robbins, Anthony & Richardson, Theory and Research on Today's New Religions, 39 
Soc. ANALYSIS 95, 111 (1978); Deprogramming: Documenting the Issue, supra note 8. 
160. See, e.g., Robbins & Anthony, supra note 159, at 79: 
The logic [of the deprogramming advocates'] argument, then, would lead either to legal 
suppression of monasteries, fraternities, the Boy Scouts, and Alcoholics Anonymous, or to 
granting courts a discretionary authority in suppressing membership in voluntary associa-
tions, which is inconsistent with our legal traditions. 
See generally E. ANDREWS, THE COMMUNITY INDUSTRIES OF THE SHAKERS 12-13 (1933); w. 
JAMES, THE VARIETIES OF RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE (1902). 
[The Shakers] consecrated themselves and their property to God, holding all their goods 
in common but owning nothing; . . . they Jed celibate lives; . . . they were the recipients 
of strange visions and the first spiritualists in America; . . . early meetings were character-
ized by unrestrained emotions and unbridled ecstacies of spirit and body; . . . they did 
not vote nor run for public office . . . . [They] considered themselves a body of saints, 
whose mission it was to redeem themselves and others from the sins of worldliness and 
carnal nature. 
E. ANDREWS, supra, at 12-13. 
161. Robbins & Anthony, supra note 159, at 79. 
162. See Robbins & Anthony, supra note 159, at 78; Shupe, Spielmann & Stigall, 
Deprogramming: The New Exorcism, 20 AM. BEHAVIORAL Sci. 941, 951 (1977); Szasz, Patty 
Hearst's Conversion: Some Call it Brainwashing, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Mar. 6, 1976, at JO. 
163. See Szasz, supra note 162, at 10-1 I. 
Like many dramatic terms, "brainwashing" is a metaphor. A person can no more wash 
another's brain with coercion or conversation than he can make him bleed with a cutting 
remark. If there is no such thing as brainwashing, what does this metaphor stand for? It 
stands for one of the most universal human experiences and events, namely for one per-
son influencing another. However, we do not call all types of personal or psychological 
influences "brainwashing." We reserve this term for influences of which we disapprove. 
Id at 11. For a brief account of the historical development of the term "brainwashing," see 
Note, supra note 4, 18 ARIZ. L. REV. at 1124-32. 
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tarian lif estyle.164 
The issue that emerges from this debate is one over which, as one 
court has noted, "[r]easonable minds could differ," 165 but courts 
should not consider brainwashing itself as a harm avoided by 
deprogramming. The recruiting and indoctrinating activities that 
critics label brainwashing constitute protected advocacy of religious 
beliefs.166 The brainwashing argument may assume that there are 
"normal" religious beliefs and "constructive" religious practices 
from which cults deviate and that deprogramming allows individuals 
to appreciate.167 It also assumes that some individuals are capable of 
influencing others in a manner so clearly contrary to their best inter-
ests that it is permissible to restrict the infiuence. 168 It overlooks, 
however, the Supreme Court's consistent rejection of both the for-
mer169 and the latter170 assumptions. 
Brainwashing itself is not cognizable as a harm avoided by 
deprogramming, but cult membership may subject individuals to 
several other types of harm as well. Courts should thus consider 
whether these alleged harms are sufficiently serious to warrant inter-
vention. Deprogrammers argue first that cults defraud members into 
devoting their efforts, if not their lives, to activities that merely ag-
164. See Robbins & Anthony, supra note 159, at 82. 
165. Katz v. Superior Court, 73 Cal. App. 3d 952, 981, 141 Cal. Rptr. 234, 251 (1977). 
166. These activities may, however, be subjected to reasonable time, place, and manner 
restrictions. See Heffron v. International Socy. for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., IOI S. Ct. 
2559, 2566 (1981) (holding that state fair rule limiting solicitation to stationary booths on fair-
ground premises does not violate first amendment; peripatetic solicitation ritual has "no spe-
cial claim to First Amendment protection as compared to that of other religions who also 
distribute literature and solicit funds"). 
167. The assumption is implicit. Although a deprogrammer might not attempt to 
reprogram a cult member into any particular religious school, see T. PATRICK & T. DULACK, 
supra note 7, at 77 ("Once ... deprogrammed (a cult member] is absolutely free to do 
whatever he wants to do."), the very act of deprogramming implies that a cult member's cur-
rent religious views are "wrong" or not what the cult member would choose ifhe or she were 
exercising "free will." See also Robbins, supra note 159, at 38 (''the concepts of mind control 
and brainwashing . . . mask a latent concern for the deviant contents of beliefs and bizarre 
results"). 
168. This assumption is also implicit. See T. PATRICK & T. DULACK, supra note 7, at 20 
("Moon's a crook, plain and simple. They're all crooks. You name 'em. Hare Krishna. The 
Divine Light Mission. Guru Maharaj Ji. The New Testament Missionary Fellowship. 
Brother Julius. Love Israel. The Children of God. Not a brown penny's worth of difference 
between any of 'em."). 
169. See West Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (striking down state 
statute requiring flag salute as violative of first amendment as applied to children whose reli-
gion prohibited such displays of nationalism and patriotism). 
170. See, e.g., Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 310 (1940): 
In the realm of religious faith, and in that of political belief, sharp differences arise. In 
both fields the tenets of one man may seem the rankest error to his neighbor. To persuade 
others to his own point of view, the pleader, as we know, at times, resorts to exaggeration, 
to vilification of men who have been, or are, prominent. . . . But the people of this na-
tion have ordained in the light of history, that, in spite of the probability of excesses and 
abuses, these liberties are, in the long view, essential to enlightened opinion and right 
conduct on the part of the citizens of a democracy. 
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grandize cult leaders.171 Although there may be some truth to this 
charge, 172 the government lacks authority to challenge solicitation of 
funds on the ground that the cult's dogma is false. 173 Because the 
Constitution forbids state interference with cults' fund-raising activi-
ties, private individuals cannot claim that courts should weigh such 
activities on the harm avoided side of the choice of evils balance. 174 
Deprogrammers argue, and some evidence suggests, that cult in-
doctrination methods can cause serious psychological damage. 
Many members appear unable to exercise independent judgment, 175 
and some research indicates that they may suffer serious, and per-
haps permanent, cognitive damage.176 Cult members' apparent dis-
sociation, 177 however, does not differ substantially from euphoric 
states that result from other, well-accepted religious activites.178 
Listlessness, lethargy, and an inability to direct one's personal affairs 
without guidance are surely unfortunate, but not serious enough to 
justify forcible deprogramming. There is respectable evidence, 
moreover, that for some individuals cult membership may be psy-
chologically beneficial, 179 and deprogramming psychologically dam-
aging.180 Finally, since states have generally declined to regulate 
cult practices to protect the psychological well-being of members, 181 
171. See Delgado, supra note 4, at 44-45. 
172. See, e.g., Rudin, supra note 2, at 27 n.66 ( collecting topical newspaper accounts of the 
opulent lifestyle of many cult leaders). 
173. United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86-88 (1944). See Schaumburg v. Citizens for 
Better Environment, 444 U.S. 620, 632, 637 (1980). 
174. See text at notes 55-57 supra. 
175. See Delgado, supra note 4, at 21-22; Shapiro, supra note 152, at 83. 
176. See VERMONT SENATE COMM., supra note 151 (statement of John Clark); Clark, 
supra note 2, at 281; Delgado, supra note 4, at 14-15; Levine, supra note 2, at 36. 
177. See note 156 supra. 
178. See, e.g., W. JAMES, supra note 160, at 62-77. 
179. Research by Ungerleider and Wellisch led them to conclude that "[n]o data emerged 
from intellectual, personality, or mental status testing to suggest that any of these subjects are 
unable or even limited in their ability to make sound judgments and legal decisions as related 
to their persons and property." Ungerleider & Wallisch, Coercive Persuasion (Brainwashing), 
Religious Cults, and J)eprogramming, 136 AM. J. PSYCH. 279, 281 (1979). Other researchers 
have reported a reduction in neurotic stress as a result of cult membership. Galanter, Rabkin, 
Rabkin & Deutsch, supra note 4, at 168 ("Affiliation with the Unification Church apparently 
provided considerable and sustained relief from neurotic distress."). 
180. Because deprogramming provides former cult members with a means to deny per-
sonal responsibility for their involvement with the cult, it may be a harmful type of therapy; 
former members may be better off if they come to grips with the personal reasons that led them 
to accept the cult's authoritarian lifestyle. See Panel i)iscussion, supra note 9, at 117, 120-21 
(statement of Dick Anthony); Anthony, supra note 159, at 86. The risks of deprogramming are 
exacerbated by the questionable qualifications of many of those involved and the possibility 
that some deprogrammers are financially, rather than benevolently, motivated, see Gutman, 
Constitutional and Legal i)imensions of J)eprogramming, in Deprogramming: Documenting 
the Issue, supra note 8, at 209. But see T. PATRICK & T. DULACK, supra note 7, at 159. 
181. Most states have statutes that allow for the appointment of guardians or conservators 
for those individuals incapable of managing their own property or affairs. At least one court 
decision involving deprogramming has held a conservatorship statute unacceptably vague in-
304 Michigan Law Review (Vol. 80:271 
it is not clear that the legislatures would condone deprogramming 
for that purpose. 182 Courts should, therefore, treat psychological 
problems as a harm avoided only where, under conventional stan-
dards of legal competency, the cult member was incapable of exer-
cising independent judgment. 
Deprogramming may also avert physical injuries that some cult 
members suffer. The rigorous routine, 183 and dangerous activities of 
many cults, 184 combined with inadequate nutrition, lack of sleep, 
and substandard living quarters, can jeopardize their members' 
physical health. The aversion of some cults to medical care magni-
fies this risk. 185 And preventing physical injury, particularly if per-
manent, falls within the scope of state police power186 because the 
value that society places on human life outweighs the value of unf et-
tered practice of religious beliefs. 187 It is reasonable, therefore, to 
argue that a deprogrammer may intervene, as the state's "agent," to 
prevent serious physical injury.188 
sofar as it allowed for the appointment of a conservator whenever the prospective conservatee 
''was likely to be deceived or imposed upon by artful or designing persons." Katz v. Superior 
Court, 73 Cal. App. 3d 952, 141 Cal. Rptr. 234, 240 n.5 (1977). The Katz court stated that "in 
the absence of such actions as render the adult believer himself gravely disabled as defined in 
the law of this state, the processes of this state cannot be used to deprive the believer of his 
freedom of action and to subject him to involuntary treatment." 73 Cal. App. 3d at 989, 141 
Cal. Rptr. at 256. 
182. The defendant invoking the choice of evils defense is not free to define subjectively 
the sorts of harms that might justify violating the law; the applicability of the defense depends 
upon whether it is reasonable to believe that the legislature would condone violating the law to 
prevent the harm in question. See text at notes 55-57 supra. It is not clear that the state could 
"police" the psychological well-being of cult members by regulating the practices that 
deprogrammers claim are injurious enough to justify deprogramming. Although the state can 
intervene to protect children and others incapable of caring for themselves, see Prince v. Mas-
sachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166-67 (1944), the Supreme Court has stated that in cases where a free 
exercise claim has been rejected that "[t]he conduct or actions so regulated have invariably 
posed some substantial threat to public sefety, peace or order." Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 
398,403 (1963) (emphasis added). See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205,215 (1972). It is thus 
far from clear that the state could regulate or restrict religious practices to prevent psychologi-
cal harms that neither threaten the general welfare nor directly endanger the cult member's 
physical well-being. 
183. See note 155 supra. 
184. See, e.g., note 196 in.fra. 
185. See Clark, supra note 2, at 280; Delgado, S11pra note 4, at 19; Rudin, supra note 2, at 
31-32 (concluding that cult membership "may be threatening to life itself"). 
186. See, e.g., Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296,308 (1940); Reynold v. United States, 
98 U.S. 145, 163 (1879). 
187. State regulation of practices that endanger health has long been justified on the 
ground that the free exercise of religion "embraces two concepts, - freedom to believe and 
freedom to act. The first is absolute but, in the nature of things, the second cannot be." 
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-04 (1940). 
188. The more difficult question is what degree of physical harm is required before forcible 
intervention is justified. Not all physical harms would "clearly outweigh" the harms caused by 
deprogramming. Inadequate sleep or a less than optimal diet would seem insufficient to justify 
deprogramming because, as a general matter, these conditions do not threaten irreparable in-
jury. But practices that may lead to irreparable physical injury should justify intervention. 
There may also be a distinction between abduction and confinement and deprogramming. 
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3. The Reasonable Belief Requirement and Alternatives to 
Deprogramming 
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To assert the choice of evils defense successfully, defendants 
must have reasonably believed that deprogramming was necessary 
and that the harms likely to be avoided clearly outweighed the 
harms likely to be caused.189 Because the average defendant may 
tend to underestimate the harms caused by deprogramming and 
overestimate the harms avoided, defendants may be able to argue 
convincingly that they made a reasonable normative mistake in bal-
ancing the harms. Proper instructions, however, will minimize the 
possibility that juries will exculpate defendants whose mistake was 
unreasonable. Courts should instruct juries to apply the same stan-
dard of reasonableness used in other areas of the law.190 Under this 
standard, most parents will be held criminally liable for deprogram-
ming except where deprogramming is clearly justified. And profes-
sional deprogrammers, who are required by the reasonable man 
standard to use any special skill, knowledge, or experience that they 
possess or should possess, will almost never be exonerated. 
At a minimum, the reasonable belief requirement demands some 
investigation of the practices of the particular cult in question and of 
their effects on the individual to be deprogrammed. Because cult 
practices and the experiences of individual members vary widely, 191 
general information will not suffice; defendants must demonstrate 
that they had specific grounds for believing that deprogramming was 
clearly justified. But contact between the parent and the cult mem-
ber might have suggested that the child is incapable of exercising 
independent judgment, 192 or that cult membership threatens serious 
and irreparable injury.193 Parents may also receive mail from the 
child that is so out of character that it provides a reasonable ground 
to believe that his faculties have deteriorated. 194 And parents' suspi-
cions may reasonably be aroused by cults' efforts to prevent contact 
with their children.195 The parents' beliefs, based on t1?-ese observa-
Although abduction might be necessary in some cases to prevent the cult member from physi-
cal harm, the need for deprogramming is less clear. Many observers point out that deprogram-
ming is as coercive as the practices that the cults allegedly engage in. See Sage, The War on 
Cults, HUMAN BEHAVIOR, Oct. 1976, at 40, 45; Shupe, Spielman & Stigall, supra note 162, at 
951; Deprogramming: Documenting the Issue, supra note 8, at 195 (statement of Allen 
Gerson). 
189. See text following note 54 supra. 
190. See, e.g., w. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS 345 (1971). 
191. See text at note 128 supra. 
192. See Clark, supra note 2, at 280. Members have been described as appearing glassy-
eyed and constantly smiling. See Shapiro, supra note 152, at 83. 
193. See notes 175-76 supra and accompanying text. 
194. See Delgado, supra note 4, at 18 n.102. 
195. See Rudin, supra note 2, at 28 ("Families often are prevented from locating or com-
municating privately with their loved ones."). Joel MacCollam asks: 
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tions, may be reinforced by information about the cult. Evidence 
from former cult members, for example, may indicate that the cult's 
activities seriously threaten members' health. If defendants produce 
substantial evidence of this type, there may be a reasonable basis for 
their belief that cult membership is harmful, and that the child is 
incapable of preventing or consenting to the harm. 196 
Even in cases where intervention appears warranted, parents and 
deprogrammers must search for viable legal alternatives. In most 
states, judicial conservatorships or guardianship proceedings are 
available to parents and friends of cult members. 197 A number of 
parents have used these proceedings successfully. 198 Where such 
proceedings are available, failure to use them should ordinarily lead 
courts to deny the choice of evils defense. Only if defendants can 
demonstrate that resort to legal proceedings would not prevent seri-
ous injury to the cult member should courts accept the defense. 
The choice of evils defense will thus rarely exonerate parents of 
adult cult members, and will virtually never exonerate professional 
deprogrammers. Deprogramming constitutes a clearly lesser evil 
only if the cult member appears incapable of exercising independent 
judgment or risks severe physical injury. Even in these situations, 
courts should reject the defense if viable legal alternatives were 
available. 
If the children are indeed not victims of mind control but are in a totally voluntary associ-
ation with the religious group, why are the cults so adverse to offering a "cooling oft" 
period where the convert can go home and prove to his parents that he is not at all a 
victim of coercion but actually acting out of his own free will? 
J. MAcCoLLAM, supra note 2, at 141 (emphasis in original). 
196. An example of such a situation is the Washington deprogramming case, where the 
defense claims the parents' beliefs were based in large part on (I) the mother's visit to the cult, 
during which the mother found her daughter to be suffering from a disease that severely disfig-
ured her face; the daughter first agreed to go to a doctor, but then declined after the cult leader 
denied permission, Memorandum For Defendant at 8, United States v. Patrick, No. CR74-
320S (W.D. Wash. Dec. II, 1974); (2) later letters from the parents were returned marked 
"refused" or "addressee unknown," id.; (3) reports indicated that two cult members had died 
after sniffing, from plastic bags, a substance called toluene, id. at 9; a former cult member 
informed the parents that this was a common practice in the cult, id. at 17; (4) a friend of the 
daughter reported to the parents that during his visit with her she had not said a word to him; 
she "simply smiled vacantly and stared at him . . . 'glassy-eyed,' " id. at 11; (5) the former cult 
member reported: 
One of the "religious" ceremonies used in the cult involved a number of members holding 
hands while sitting in a circle, one of them holding metal somehow attached to the room's 
electrical outlet. The current was turned on, causing it to run through the bodies of all 
those in the circle. One by one, members would leave the circle, increasing the current 
being endured by the remainder. The record as to the fewest number willing to so prove 
their faith was two, both of whom became frightened when they could not release each 
other's hands or the electrified piece of metal. A "religious" spectator had to remove the 
plug from the outlet. 
Id. at 17-18. 
197. See Note, supra note 4, 18 ARIZ. L. REV. at 1108. 
198. Id. at 1108-09. But see Katz v. Superior Ct., 73 Cal. App. 3d 952, 141 Cal. Rptr. 234 
(1977). 
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B. .Deprogramming and the "Compulsion" .Defense 
To decide whether defendants in deprogramming cases may suc-
cessfully raise the proposed compulsion defense, courts should con-
sider evidence similar to that presented under the choice of evils 
defense. The availability of the defense, however, depends not on 
the objective desirability of intervention, but on whether the defend-
ant acted understandably. The fact-finder must ask whether individ-
uals of ordinary firmness and respect for the law would behave 
similarly in the defendant's position.199 This necessarily entails ex-
amining the identity of the defendant and the circumstances that af-
fected him. 
Parents y,,hose children join cults will often have cause for con-
cern about the child's well-being.200 In many cases, those close to 
the child witness sudden and radical changes in personality201 and 
lifestyle, frequently accompanied by total rejection of his past. Cult 
members are often openly hostile to parents and former friends.202 
To help them to understand these changes,203 parents may tum to 
one of a growing number of anticult organizations.204 These organi-
zations introduce parents to former cult members, parents of former 
members, and deprogrammers, many of whom urge that the child is 
in daµger and must be protected from the cult. 205 These factors, and 
the close relationship between a parent or friend and the cult mem-
ber, 206 may cause parents or friends to believe that intervention is 
199. See text at note 115 supra. 
200. See notes 175-77 & 183-85 and accompanying text. 
201. See Clark, supra note 2, at 280 (''While in this state, personality changes drastically -
a fact that often brings terrified parents into the physician's office."); Rudin, supra note 2, at 20 
("a complete personality transformation seems to occur''). But see Simmonds, Conversion or 
Addiction: Consequences of Joining a Jesus Movement Group, 20 AM. BEHAVIORAL Sci. 909 
(1977). 
202. See Shapiro, supra note 152, at 81. 
203. It has been suggested that because of the emotional distress suffered by the parents of 
cult members, ''they are desperately in need of support and understanding." Shapiro, supra 
note 152, at 81. See generally J. MAcCOLLAM, supra note 2, at 83 (''Many families have seen 
strong and healthy parents reduced to physical or emotional cripples from the exhaustion and 
strain under which cult parents often live."); Delgado, supra note 4, at 29 (some parents "have 
suffered mental and physical illnesses as a result of the stress of forced separation from and 
concern over the welfare of a loved child"). 
204. See History of the Deprogramming Movement, in Deprogramming: Documenting the 
Issue, supra note 8, at 12 (suggesting that "a vast underground network of communications, 
referrals, transportation, and housing" to be used for deprogrammings has developed). But see 
J. MAcCOLLAM, supra note 2, at 125 (responding to this allegation by suggesting that there is, 
at most, informal contact between these organizations). 
It has been argued that contact is sometimes initiated by the organization, rather than by 
the parents. See Step by Step Account of the Events Leading lo the Procuring and Issuance of a 
Conservatorship, in Deprogramming: Documenting the Issue, supra note 8, at 44. 
205. Id See Simmons, Deprogramming: The Wrong Answer far Concerned Parents, in 
Deprogramming: Documenting the Issue, supra note 8, at 202. 
206. Courts and commentators have recognized that the emotional pressures caused by a 
threat to an individual's child may be just as great as, if not greater than, those resulting from a 
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essential.207 
Regardless of their motives, many parents will find the decision 
to deprogram one of the most difficult and stressful decisions of their 
lives.208 At least two courts have recognized the pressure that par-
ents face. In rejecting a cult member's tort action for false imprison-
ment, a Rhode Island district court stated that "Mrs. Weiss' actions 
... arose not from her abhorrence of the Unification Church per se, 
but rather arose directly from a solicitude which a mother holds for 
her daughter's health and well-being."209 Similarly, in a Washing-
ton criminal deprogrammine case, the court concluded that "the par-
ents who would do less than what Mr. and Mrs. Crampton did for 
their daughter Kathe would be less than responsible, loving par-
ents."210 The Washington court's conclusion may seem overstated, 
but it is reasonable to conclude that many parents are likely to take 
socially undesirable actions on behalf of their children. 
In considering the application of the compulsion defense to par-
ents, courts should engage in a three-step inquiry. The initial re-
quirement of an honest and reasonable belief in a threat of serious 
injury to the actor or someone close to the actor could be satisfied by 
evidence supporting a reasonable belief that the cult threatened the 
child's capacity for independent judgment or his physical health. 
But general evidence about cults does not provide a reasonable basis 
for inferring danger from a particular cult.211 Similarly, the fact that · 
a child dropped out of school to join the cult, standing alone, should 
not support an inference of physical or psychological danger. Par-
ents could satisfy the standard by demonstrating that they knew that 
the cult had engaged in practices jeopardizing physical or psycholog-
ical well-being, or if contact with the child led them reasonably to 
perceive a risk of such harm. 
If this first requirement is met, the court must determine whether 
the pressure was sufficient to overcome a reasonable person's resis-
threat directed at the individual. See United States v. Gamer, 529 F.2d 962, 969-71 (6th Cir.), 
cert. denied, 426 U.S. 922 (1976); United States v. Gordon, 526 F.2d 406, 408 n.1 (9th Cir. 
1975); State v. Toscano, 74 NJ. 421,437,378 A.2d 755, 763 (1977); Hersey & Avins, supra note 
102, at 286. 
207. The explanation for parents' actions may be more complicated. Several authorities 
suggest that parents feel a sense of guilt, and perhaps hostility, when their children reject them, 
their lifestyle, and their values. Rather than accepting their "failure," parents may rationalize 
that the cult has victimized their child. See Robbins & Anthony, supra note 159, at 81; Sage, 
supra note 188, at 45. 
208. See J. MAcCOLLAM, supra note 2, at 72. Besides requiring a large investment of time 
and money, see Simmons, supra note 205, parents risk criminal and tort liability, and, more 
realistically, permanently destroying their relationship with the child, see Anthony, supra note 
128, at 86. 
209. Weiss v. Patrick, 453 F. Supp. 717, 724 (D.R.I.), qffd, 588 F.2d 818 (1st Cir. 1978), 
cert. denied, 442 U.S. 929 (1979). 
210. United States v. Patrick, No. CR74-320-5, slip op. at 78 (W.D. Wash. Dec. II, 1974). 
211. See text at note 191 supra. 
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tance. In analyzing this question, courts should consider both the 
interest threatened and the probability that the perceived harm 
would occur. The close relation between the defendant and the child 
suggests that low levels of pressure may overcome reasonable resis-
tance.212 To assess the probability of the harm occurring, courts 
should again consider the information available to the parents, and 
distinguish between general evidence and evidence derived from 
contact with the child. If the parents rely on the former, courts could 
exclude the defense unless strong evidence suggested a threat. The 
mere possibility of some injury to the child should not overcome the 
resistance of a reasonable person.213 However, if the parent's contact 
with the child suggests that the perceived risk is imminent (e.g., the 
child appears incapable of independent judgment), the court should 
allow the jury to consider whether an ordinary person's resistance 
would have been overwhelmed. 
Finally, if the court is convinced that the circumstances would 
have overcome an ordinary person's resistance, it should consider 
whether the defendant's action was excusable. Most parents do not 
hurriedly make the decision to deprogram; although their emotional 
state may prevent them from correctly assessing the child's situation, 
they do attempt to investigate alternatives to forcible abduction.214 
Unless there is evidence that the child's condition would have mate-
rially worsened without immediate action, an ordinary person in the 
parent's situation would make such an investigation. The investiga-
tion - if only consulting a lawyer - should reveal the availability 
of conservatorships as an alternative when such proceedings are 
available. 
Consequently, the defense generally should not avail parents 
who did not inquire about or who simply ignored legal alternatives 
in a state where a guardianship/conservatorship proceeding is a via-
ble alternative. Because guardianship proceedings .are used only in-
frequently, hQ_weve~, the failure to pursue this option should not 
conclusively decide the issue. If the threat were particularly severe;·· 
emoti~nally upset parents might believe that intervention is essential 
212. It is conceivable that in some cases a court could find lacking the necessary closeness 
between parents and an adult child to justify recognition of the compulsion defense. This 
might be the case, for example, if the parents and child had been separated for a long period of 
time. But as a general matter, it is reasonable to assume that parents will be sufficiently close 
to even adult children to justify recognition of the defense. This view is in accord with the 
authorities who suggest that harm posed to relatives is sufficient ground for recognition of the 
duress defense. See Hersey & Avins, supra note 102, at 286; Newman & Weitzer, supra note 
32, at 323; Note, Criminal Law- .Duress-Standard far .Duress Based Upon Person of Reason-
able Firmness with Burden of Persuasion by Preponderance of Evidence Upon .Defendant -
State v. Toscano, 74 N.J. 421, 378 A.2d 775 (1977), 9 SETON HALL L. R.Ev. 556, 561 (1978). 
213. Such a view is consistent with the traditional approach, which required a specific 
threat, rather than the possibility of some future harm. Even those cases that have urged an 
exception to this rule have based it on the high probablity of the future harm occurring. 
214. See, e.g., F. CONWAY & J. SPIEGELMAN, supra note 155, at 83. 
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and yet be convinced that there is little chance of prevailing in court 
because of judicial reluctance to interfere with religion and the lim-
ited use of these proceedings in the past.215 Additionally, if the par-
ents obtained legal advice, but were not informed of this option, 
their involvement in deprogramming might be excusable. 
There are circumstances in which parents, and perhaps close 
friends, could successfully assert the compulsion defense, but it usu-
ally would not exculpate other parties. Courts could reject other 
parties' attempts to assert the defense as a matter of law because the 
threat was not to someone close to the deprogrammer. While the 
natural bond between parents and children may prevent parents 
from making a socially rational decision, professional deprogram-
mers have no special circumstances that make their decisions so un-
derstandable. Instead of reacting like ordinary people, 
deprogrammers have distinguished themselves by deciding to take 
the law into their own hands. 
CONCLUSION 
More than sixty years ago, the Supreme Court replaced the rigid 
retreat requirement in self-defense cases with a rule providing that 
failure to retreat should only be considered as one factor in deter-
mining the reasonableness of a defendant's behavior.216 Justice 
Holmes observed that such reform was necessary because the origi-
nal cases developing the defense "had a tendency to ossify into spe-
cific rules without much regard for reason."217 The process of 
ossification is again apparent in the development of the unitary ap-
proach to the necessity defense. The unhappy result of this process is 
the gulf that presently exists between the policies underlying neces-
sity and the rules that define the defense. To further these policies 
more effectively and coherently, courts should adopt a dualistic 
approach. 
The inadequacy of the traditional necessity defense is evident in 
the deprogramming cases. In these cases, courts should carefully 
consider the applicability of the policies justifying the defense. If 
deprogramming is clearly necessary to protect a cult member, and if 
there is no legal means to meet this necessity, then the choice of evils 
defense is applicable. If the pressures on the parents were so great 
that their irrational decision is ''understandable," then the compul-
215. This does not mean that the perceived unwillingness of the courts to act would ordi-
narily be a reasonable basis for disregarding this option. However, given the diminished ca-
pacity of the defendant, a court might find that the defendant's refusal to rely on this 
alternative was understandable. 
216. See Delgado, Religious Tota/ism as Slavery, 9 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 51 
(1980). 
217. Brown v. United States, 256 U.S. 335, 343 (1921). 
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sion defense applies. But the rigid, and often unjustified, limitations 
that have been placed on the necessity defense have prevented courts 
from confronting the important questions that deprogramming cases 
raise. 
Whether one views deprogramming as a rescue from slavery or 
as a gross intrusion on religious liberty, it is rather extraordinary that 
such an important decision has largely been left in private hands. 
Strong legislative decisions either for or against cults in the foresee-
able future, however, are unlikely.218 This inaction can be attributed 
to the clash between legislative reluctance to interfere with religion 
and legislative concern with the well-being of cult members, as well 
as to sympathy for the position of distraught parents. As long as 
legislatures are abdicating some authority to make these decisions to 
private individuals, it is essential that courts rationally supervise the 
way that this authority is exercised. Such a supervisory role can in 
part be performed through the reasonable application of the defenses 
of choice of evils and compulsion. 
218. See generally N.Y. Times, May 22, 1981, at 10, col. 5 (discussing legislative actions 
that have been taken). 
